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 Abstract 
The skill gap in geographical mobility is entirely driven by workers who report moving for a new job. 
A natural explanation lies in the large expected surplus accruing to skilled job matches. Just as large 
surpluses ease the frictions which impede job search in general, they also help overcome those 
frictions (specifically moving costs) which plague cross-city matching in particular. I reject the 
alternative hypothesis that mobility differences are driven by variation in the moving costs 
themselves, based on PSID evidence on self-reported willingness to move. Evidence on wage 
processes also supports my claims. 
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1 Introduction
It has long been known that better educated individuals are more mobile geographically; see
Greenwood (1975) for a survey. Recent evidence suggests the effect is causal (Malamud and
Wozniak, 2012; Machin, Salvanes and Pelkonen, 20121). Figure 1 plots US cross-county mo-
bility rates for household heads2, by age3 and education4, based on the March waves of the
Current Population Survey5 (CPS). The skill mobility gap is driven by the under-35s; and
among this group, college graduates are about one third more mobile than non-graduates.
But, this obscures much starker patterns. Figure 2 shows the gap is entirely driven by
workers who report moving county for job reasons. Among those aged 25-34s, 2 percent
of high school dropouts make job-motivated moves annually, compared to 7 percent of the
postgraduate-educated. There are also positive education effects among older workers. This
steep skill gradient is swamped by a large quantity of “non-job” moves6 (primarily family and
housing-related), whose frequency is (if anything) decreasing in education. The fact that low
skilled workers so rarely move for job reasons is concerning, given that they suffer dispropor-
tionately from local business cycle volatility (Hoynes, 2002).
I argue the obstacle to low skilled mobility is exactly that which impedes low skilled job
finding more generally: meager job surpluses (or returns to a match), irrespective of geography.
Table 1 confirms that workers with limited education do suffer lower job finding rates.7 And
I claim the impact on cross-city job finding is particularly debilitating: the small surpluses
in low skilled matches are usually insufficient to fund the cost of migrating. This effect is
reinforced by slim investment in cross-city search by both workers and firms, as well as limited
job creation. The overall impact is larger for the young, as they make more job transitions.
For the most part, the previous literature has relied on a location choice framework. This
yields two possible explanations for the skill mobility gap. Either the low skilled face large
moving costs, whether due to financial constraints, lack of information or home attachment
(Greenwood, 1973; Topel, 1986; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Wozniak, 2010; Kennan, 2015).8
1These studies exploit randomness from the Vietnam war draft in the US and a Norwegian compulsory school-
ing reform respectively.
2In each household, I define the head as the individual with the greatest predicted earnings power. Earnings
power is predicted using aMincer regression of log weekly wages on a detailed set of characteristics (see Appendix
A for further details). In households with multiple predicted top-earners, I divide the person weights by the number
of top-earners.
3I restrict attention to the over-25s. This helps ensure my results are not conflated by individuals leaving
college. In any case, I exclude those who explicitly report moving primarily to attend or leave college: these
account for 2 percent of the remaining cross-county migrant sample.
4I define five education groups: high school dropout (less than 12 years of schooling), high school graduate
(12 years of schooling), some college (between 1 and 3 years of college), undergraduate (4 years of college) and
postgraduate (5 or more years of college).
5I use the March CPS files organized by IPUMS (King et al., 2010).
6The prevalence of other reasons for moving is consistent with Yagan’s (2014) finding that migration is largely
“undirected”: a large fraction of migrants do not move to cities with better employment opportunities.
7The difference is moderate among the unemployed, as documented by e.g. Mincer, 1991, and more substantial
among the inactive.
8Gregg, Machin and Manning (2004) suggest that college graduates have weaker home attachment, having
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Or they face narrow geographical differentials in expected disposable income, whether due to
transfer payments and housing costs (Notowidigdo, 2011) or labor productivity (Lkhagvasuren,
2014; Davis and Dingel, 2012). See also Moretti (2011) for a survey.
My hypothesis also emphasizes the role of productivity and out-of-work income. But, I
consider migration in the context of broader job search. This approach follows an early study
by Schwartz (1976), later echoed by Wildasin (2000). Given the specialized skills of better
educated workers, they argue both applicants and recruiters search in more locations (including
their own) for the ideal match. This is irrespective of any complementarities between particular
skills and locations.
I build on these ideas in two ways. First, I study these processes using an equilibrium
model9. This yields new insights. Rather than just emphasizing match dispersion in productiv-
ity (or skill specialization), the model show it is the expected job surplus more generally which
matters. In particular, the average productivity of labor (relative to out-of-work income) and job
tenure are also important contributors to the expected surplus and therefore mobility (Table 1
documents a steep negative skill gradient in separation rates; see also Mincer, 1991). This point
illustrates the common determinants of immobility and joblessness. My second contribution is
to test the mechanisms outlined in the model using new empirical evidence.
The model is a multi-city version of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework set out
in Pissarides (2000). There are many identical cities, each with its own matching function
over local unemployed workers and vacancies. But, workers and firms can also participate in a
national matching function involving agents in all cities: this is the source of migration. Once
a match is made (in either market), a random productivity parameter is drawn independently of
geography; and the match is consummated if both parties accept. Importantly, workers pay a
fixed matching cost (or “migration cost”) on accepting a national market job offer.
While matching is random within markets, search is somewhat directed: workers and firms
choose how intensively they search (or advertise) in both the local and national market. Local
markets are effectively integrated geographically, with the extent of this integration driven by
the national search intensity, which itself is endogenously determined. This set-up contrasts
with Moen’s (1997) textbook directed search model, which restricts agents’ search activities
to a single submarket (there is no national market). The same can be said of the competitive
model of urban labor markets developed by Roback (1982). There also, workers are restricted
to operating in one of many distinct local labor markets, with migration interpreted as “spatial
arbitrage” between them. Molho (2001) makes a similar point.10
already left home to study, though Malamud and Wozniak (2012) dispute this hypothesis. Both these studies
propose that long-distance job search is more costly for lower skilled workers, whether due to a lack of information
or fewer social contacts in other cities. In addition to these ideas, Bound and Holzer (2000) suggest a lack of assets
may constrain the set of location choices, especially if house prices are higher in desirable cities.
9Schwartz (1976) does not present an equilibrium model, and Wildasin’s (2000) argument is descriptive.
10Recent work by Beaudry et al. (2012; 2014a; 2014b) has integrated job matching into urban frameworks,
with each city having its own matching function. But, they do not allow for matching across cities. In contrast,
Jackman and Savouri (1992) argue that internal migration should be interpreted as cross-city job matching. More
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I do not include multiple skill groups in the model. Instead, I explore the effects of changing
key parameters on the cross-city mobility of homogeneous workers. The model offers two
explanations for the skill mobility gap. Either skilled workers face lower cross-city matching
costs. Or larger job surpluses facilitate more cross-city matching, despite prohibitive moving
costs. Larger surpluses arise in the model from higher average productivity (relative to out-of-
work income), larger dispersion in match quality, or a lower separation rate.
On assuming identical cities, notice I rule out the possibility that the mobility gap is driven
by large net flows of skilled workers to particular locations.11 I show in Appendix A that this
is consistent with the evidence: even in comparisons across detailed occupation groups, net
flows across states in (self-reported) job-motivated migration vary little with skill level.12 For
example, net flows of bankers across states are not much greater than net flows of hairdressers.
It is notoriously difficult to evaluate the role of moving costs in the skill mobility gap, and
the debate in the literature attests to this. Some studies have inferred moving costs in differ-
ent skill groups from a structural model, whether by estimation (Kennan, 2015) or calibration
(Lkhagvasuren, 2014). I take an alternative approach, imputing moving costs directly from
subjective responses in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
In the 1970s, the PSID asked respondents whether they would move away for the sake of
a “good” job. 50 percent of employed and 73 percent of unemployed workers answered yes,
and these fractions vary little with education. Among those answering yes, the PSID asked for
the lowest wage offer which would tempt them to move. I impute migration costs by taking
the difference between this wage and the average wage the worker earned through the previous
year. Again, it turns out this imputed cost varies little with education. Of course, this exercise
is only valuable if these subjective responses are informative about true costs; and I show they
do have explanatory power for future migration decisions. Also, I find no evidence that lower
skilled workers systematically overstate the likelihood of a job-motivated move.
recently, Manning and Petrongolo (2011) have studied the geographical extent of labor markets, using a model
where workers simultaneously apply to jobs in multiple locations. Using British data from public employment
agencies on applicants and vacancies, they find that labor markets are very local: the utility of job offers declines
exponentially at around 0.3km from a worker’s residence. But, they argue higher skilled markets are likely to be
broader. Marinescu and Rathelot (2014) estimate the model using job application data from the US. Also, Lutgen
and der Linden (2013) have developed a cross-city search model to explore the implications of more efficient
online job search.
11Such a view might sit comfortably with evidence on various agglomeration effects. For example, Wheeler
(2001) argues that skilled workers benefit from larger urban wage premia arising from market size externalities
and complementarities in production. Costa and Kahn (2000) suggests instead that large cities offer better oppor-
tunities to college educated couples (it is more likely that both spouses will find a good job match). And Diamond
(2013) argues that college graduates are attracted by the amenities (such as better schools and low crime) which
endogenously arise in skill-intensive cities.
12It has long been known that gross migration flows dominate net flows across locations (Shryock, 1959;
Schwartz, 1971; Jackman and Savouri, 1992; Wildasin, 2000; Coen-Pirani, 2010). Indeed, this fact is central
to Wildasin’s contention that migration is driven primarily by the specializations of individual workers and firms:
these idiosyncratic matches dominate aggregate adjustments between local areas. It has also been documented
that the ratio of net to gross migration is smaller for better educated individuals (Folger and Nam, 1967; Schwartz,
1971; Lkhagvasuren, 2014). In Appendix A, I show this result is driven by job-motivated migration in particular,
and it also holds for comparisons across detailed occupation groups (not just broad education groups).
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If moving costs do not account for the mobility gap, what does? The PSID also asked
whether there were better jobs available in other cities. Higher skilled workers were more
likely to say yes; and fewer of them reported not knowing. This suggests skilled mobility is
driven by greater availability of valuable job matches and better information on these matches:
these are corollaries of larger surpluses in the model. Indeed, I present more direct evidence in
Appendix B of intensive (and geographically broader) search by firms and workers in skilled
markets, based on employer and labor force surveys respectively. And I also show that vacancy-
unemployment ratios tend to be larger.
While job surplus cannot be observed directly, it can be inferred from the dispersion of
wages accepted by an individual over time. Using the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation (SIPP), Fitzgerald (1999) shows that skilled workers are indeed subject to larger
innovations in hourly wages13; and I report similar findings below. I also attempt a simple cal-
ibration exercise: given the distribution of imputed moving costs from the PSID, my estimates
of skill differences in expected surplus are of sufficient magnitude to explain the skill mobility
gap.
Advocates of cost-based explanations for the mobility gap have often emphasized evidence
of a spatially inelastic supply of low skilled labor. In particular, Bound and Holzer (2000), Woz-
niak (2010), Notowidigdo (2011) and Amior and Manning (2014) find that the low skilled are
less likely to leave their city following a slump in local demand.14 This view is also supported
by results from Kennan (2015). On estimating a dynamic structural model of migration15, he
finds that much of the observed mobility gap is not explained by geographical wage dispersion,
whether aggregate-level or individual-specific. His model assigns the residual to unspecified
“costs”.
But, these findings are not at odds with my claims: my definition of “moving costs” is
somewhat limited. For example, Gregg, Machin and Manning (2004) and Malamud and Woz-
niak (2012) argue that cross-city job search is more costly for the low skilled. But, I exclude
these “information costs” from my moving cost definition. Rather, I interpret such frictions as
an endogenous response to a small expected surplus, mediated by meager investment by firms
in long-distance advertising. Fundamentally, it is the small gains to employment (irrespective
of geography) which discourage low skilled workers from leaving cities suffering local shocks.
I show how this result can be derived from my model.
One particular piece of evidence, relating to speculative migration, lends credibility to this
emphasis on search intensity. In the main exposition of the model, I rule out the possibility
13This finding is not well known, because much of the literature on earnings processes has focused on monthly
or annual earnings, rather than hourly wages. As it happens, there is little systematic effect of skill on the volatility
of monthly earnings.
14Topel (1986) and Bound and Holzer (2000) suggest this explains the large local wage volatility suffered by
the low skilled (as documented by Hoynes, 2002). And Gregg, Machin and Manning (2004) relate this inelastic
supply to the large local differentials in low skilled jobless rates.
15The model is based on Kennan and Walker (2011), who use it to measures the responsiveness of cross-state
migration to expected gains in lifetime income.
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of moving to look for work without a job in hand. Given the risk involved (as Molho, 2001,
emphasizes), such speculative moves only account for 3 percent of cross-county migration.16
But, despite the steep skill gradient in job-motivated migration in Figure 2 (largely driven by
moves for specific jobs), the lower skilled are more likely to make speculative moves. As I
show in an extension to the model in Appendix C, this is a natural consequence of a small
expected surplus and meager investment in cross-city search. Given the poor integration of
national markets, the low skilled are forced into this risky strategy.
The key point is that low skilled immobility is less a cause of joblessness, and more a
symptom of the low returns to work associated with limited human capital. This matters for
the policy debate, given growing calls for relocation assistance for the unemployed (see e.g.
Ludwig and Raphael, 2010; Moretti, 2012).
In the following section, I set out my cross-city matching model. And in Section 3, I
show how match productivity and the job separation rate affect cross-city mobility and other
outcomes of interest. As I show in Section 4, there is little support in the PSID for claims that
moving costs vary by skill. But, wage processes from the SIPP are consistent with large skilled
job surpluses. I also document the evidence on speculative job moves; and I argue the negative
skill gradient in non-job motivation (illustrated in Figure 2) casts further doubt on the moving
costs explanations. I conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
2.1 Overview
I set the model in continuous time. The economy consists of a measure 1 of workers and J
identical cities, where J is large. Each worker is characterized by an “origin city”, with an
equal measure of workers assigned to each city. These origins determine workers’ access to
local job markets, as I explain below. Origins are fixed, irrespective of migration histories.
Workers are either employed or unemployed, and the latter receive a flow utility b. For
simplicity, I assume that only the unemployed search for work. But, I sketch an extension with
on-the-job search in Appendix C: the key results are unaffected. Firms are homogeneous and
are free to open vacancies in any city. Each firm employs a single worker to produce a single
output good, with price normalized to 1.
There are two frictions which impede job matching. The first is the cost of search. In this
model, agents can engage in both local and national search. There are J+1 job markets, each
characterized by a distinct Cobb-Douglas matching function: J local markets and one national
market. Only workers of origin j and local firms have access to city j’s local market; but all
agents have access to the national market. Unemployed workers of origin j choose local and
national search intensities sL j and sN j, at a cost 12gsXs
2
X j in market X = {L,N}. And similarly,
16Based on the March CPS between 1999 and 2013.
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firms choose advertising intensities aL j and aN j, at a cost 12gaXa
2
X j. I allow the search cost
parameters gsX and gaX to vary by agent type and market X17, though this is unnecessary for
the main results. Notice that an origin j worker and a firm located in j can meet through both
the local and the national market. But, since there are many cities, the likelihood of the latter is
negligible.
The second friction is a matching cost m> 0, paid by workers on acceptance of a national
market match. Assuming there is no cross-city commuting, m can be interpreted as a one-off
moving expense. Once a worker loses his job, he returns to his origin city at no cost.
When a worker and firm are matched, a productivity y is drawn from some distribution F ,
where F is independent of city. Matches are consummated if the job surplus exceeds zero, and
the wage is set according to a Nash bargain.18 Matches are separated at an exogenous rate d ,
though I show in Appendix C that the key results are merely reinforced if d is endogenous.
2.2 Matching
The flow of matches in the national market is:
z(s¯Nu, a¯Nv) = (s¯Nu)a (a¯Nv)1 a (1)
where u and v are the total measure of unemployed workers and vacancies, and s¯N and a¯N are
the average national search and advertising intensities. This approach of integrating search and
advertising intensity into the matching function follows Pissarides (2000): the two arguments
of z represent the aggregate search intensity of workers and firms respectively.
The local matching function in city j is identical:
z
 
s¯L ju j, a¯N jv j
 
=
 
s¯N ju j
 a  a¯N jv j 1 a (2)
where u j is the stock of origin j workers and v j the stock of local vacancies. s¯L j and a¯L j are the
average local search and advertising intensities, among city j’s workers and firms. Since cities
are identical, u j = uz , v j =
v
z , s¯L j = s¯L and a¯L j = a¯L for all j.
And so, per unit of search in market X = {L,N}, the matching rates for workers and firms
are
⇣
a¯X
s¯X q
⌘1 a
and
⇣
a¯X
s¯X q
⌘ a
respectively, where q = vu denotes the market tightness.
17For example, search might be more costly in the national market because of costly travel and costly advertising
in national media outlets.
18The precise rent sharing rule is not important, as long as both wages and profits are increasing in job surplus:
this ensures that both workers and firms invest resources in search effort.
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2.3 Worker and firm values
Let Uj be the unemployment value of workers of origin j. Given the symmetry of the model,
Uj =U for all j.19 Specifically:
rU = b+ Â
X={L,N}
max
sX
(
sX
✓
a¯X
s¯X
q
◆1 a
UˆX   12gsXs
2
X
)
(3)
where, for each market X = {L,N}, workers choose the optimal search intensity sX . Assuming
cities are large, workers take the average search intensity s¯X as given. r is the discount rate,
and UˆX is the expected value to the worker (before the match quality is revealed) of a match in
market X . Specifically:
UˆX =
ˆ
y
max{EX (y) U mX ,0}dF (4)
On discovering the productivity of a type X match, the worker accepts if EX (y) U   mX ,
where EX is the employment value and mX is the matching cost. As described above, mL = 0
for local matches, and mN = m> 0 for national matches. The employment value is:
rEX (y) = wX (y)+d (U EX (y)) (5)
where wX (y) is the negotiated wage, given match type X and a productivity draw of y. This
equation also accounts for the expected loss of value from a random job separation, arriving at
rate d .
The problem faced by firms is similar. Unlike workers though, firms choose the city j that
yields the largest vacancy value:
V =max
j
Vj (6)
In a spatial equilibrium, Vj =V for all j, where:
rV = Â
X={L,N}
max
aX
(
aX
✓
a¯X
s¯X
q
◆ a
VˆX   12gaXa
2
X
)
(7)
The intuition is identical to above: for each market X , firms choose the optimal advertising
intensity aX . Assuming cities are large, firms take the average advertising intensity a¯X as given.
VˆX is the expected value to the firm of a match in market X , where:
19I do not grant workers a choice over origin cities. But despite this, the value of unemployment is still invariant
across origins in equilibrium (because of the symmetry of the model). Consequently, an equilibrium withUj =U
would still exist if I allowed workers to choose their origin. But, that equilibrium would be unstable because
workers and firms would be better off if they all clustered at a single location, minimizing search and matching
costs. In this framework, I could ensure stability by incorporating diminishing returns to locations (whether
through the local production function, congestion externalities or imperfectly elastic housing supply). But since
this is not my focus, I keep the model simple and assume fixed origins.
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VˆX =
ˆ
y
max{JX (y) V,0}dF (8)
The match is consummated if JX (y) V . The value of a filled job JX (y) varies with market X ,
because the wage bargain is affected by the matching cost:
rJX (y) = y wX (y)+d (V   JX (y)) (9)
The intuition behind this equation is identical to (5). Conditional on the draw of y, I define the
match surplus gross of the matching cost as:
S (y) = EX (y) U+ JX (y) V
=
1
r+d
(y  rU  rV ) (10)
A match in market X is accepted if S (y)  mX , or equivalently if y  y˜X , where:
y˜X = rU+ rV +(r+d )mX (11)
If so, the surplus net of the matching cost is shared according to a Nash bargain:
EX (y) U mX = f [S (y) mX ] (12)
where f denotes the bargaining power of workers. The equilibrium wage can be derived by
substituting equation (5) for EX (y) in the Nash bargain:
wX (y) = f (y  rV )+(1 f)(mX + rU) (13)
2.4 Search effort choices
For market X , the first order conditions for search and advertising intensity are:
sX =
f
gsX
✓
a¯X
s¯X
q
◆1 a ˆ
y
max{S (y) mX ,0}dF (14)
and
aX =
1 f
gaX
✓
a¯X
s¯X
q
◆ a ˆ
y
max{S (y) mX ,0}dF (15)
respectively. Clearly, search and advertising intensity are larger in local markets. This is be-
cause (1) the search cost is smaller (gsL < gsN and gaL < gaN) and (2) no matching cost m is
paid.
In equilibrium, all workers and firms choose the same search and advertising intensities, so
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s¯X = sX and a¯X = aX . The first order conditions then yield a simple expression for the relative
search effort of workers and firms:
sX
aX
=
s
f
1 f
gaX
gsX
q (16)
This varies with market X if either workers or firms have a comparative advantage in national
search. Substituting this back into the first order conditions yields:
sX =
f
gsX
✓
1 f
f
gsX
gaX
q
◆ 1 a
2
ˆ
y
max{S (y) mX ,0}dF (17)
and
aX =
1 f
gaX
✓
1 f
f
gsX
gaX
q
◆ a2 ˆ
y
max{S (y) mX ,0}dF (18)
Also, notice that applying the first order conditions to equation (3) gives:
rU = b+
1
2
✓
1 f
f
q
◆1 a
Â
X={L,N}
1
gasXg
1 a
aX

f
ˆ
y
max{S (y) mX ,0}dF
 2
(19)
in equilibrium. Similarly, applying them to (7):
rV =
1
2
✓
1 f
f
q
◆ a
Â
X={L,N}
1
gasXg
1 a
aX

(1 f)
ˆ
y
max{S (y) mX ,0}dF
 2
(20)
And combining equations (19) and (20):
rU b
rV
=
f
1 f q (21)
where the ratio of the unemployment to vacancy value is increasing in market tightness q .
2.5 Job finding and migration rates
Let r be the job finding rate. This can be decomposed into local and national components:
r = rL+rN , where:
rX = sX
✓
aX
sX
q
◆1 a
[1 F (y˜X)] (22)
=
f
gasXg
1 a
aX
✓
1 f
f
q
◆1 a ˆ
y
max{S (y) mX ,0}dF · [1 F (y˜X)]
for X = {L,N}, after substituting (16) and (17). The equilibrium unemployment rate is:
9
u=
d
d +r
(23)
And since I have assumed that only the unemployed search for jobs (and migrate), the migration
rate µ is:
µ = rNu=
drN
d +r
(24)
2.6 Equilibrium
I have so far described three key equations: (10), (19) and (20). But, these contain four un-
knowns: U , V , S (y) and q . To complete the system, I impose a free entry condition. Suppose
the cost of opening a vacancy is fixed at V¯ , so firms have an incentive to enter the economy as
long as V   V¯ . In equilibrium, the following condition must be satisfied:
V = V¯ (25)
The equilibrium wage wX (y), search intensity sX , advertising intensity aX , finding rate rX and
migration rate µ can then be solved as a function of the unknowns above using (13), (17), (18),
(22) and (24) respectively.
3 Impact of job surplus
3.1 Impact on local matching
In this section, I show how larger job surpluses (driven by the match productivity distribution
or separation rate) ease both the frictions which impede job search in general and cross-city
matching in particular. I first focus on the implications for local job finding, ignoring migration.
To this end, I suppress the national market to ease the exposition. This effectively collapses the
model to a single city.
To simplify the exposition, I assume the productivity distribution F is uniform with y 2
[y¯ s , y¯+s ]. The expected surplus accruing to a random match is then:
ˆ
y
max{S (y) ,0}dF = 1
4s (r+d )
 
y¯ b+s   rU˘  rV¯ 2 (26)
where rU˘ = rU b is the expected return to job search activities.
It is simple to show that the expected surplus is increasing in y¯  b and s and decreasing
in d . Notice first that, according to (26), this must be true if U˘ is held constant. In particular,
the impact of s follows from an option value argument: since all jobs with negative surplus are
rejected anyway, only the upside from growing dispersion will affect the expected match value.
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Next, notice the expression for U˘ in (19) can be simplified by substituting (21) for q :
rU˘ =
"✓
1 f
f
◆2 1
rV¯
# 1 a
a
"
1
2gasLg
1 a
aL
✓
f
ˆ
y
max{S (y) ,0}dF
◆2# 1a
(27)
This shows that U˘ is increasing in (and fully determined by) the expected surplus. It then
follows that both U˘ and the expected surplus are increasing in y¯ b and s and decreasing in d .
I set out the complete derivations in Appendix D.
A larger expected surplus also materializes in a tighter labor market. This can be seen in
equation (21), as q is increasing in U˘ , with the vacancy value fixed at V¯ . Intuitively, given
the free entry condition, firms respond to larger surpluses by creating more vacancies. And in
equilibrium, firms trade off larger job surpluses with smaller hiring probabilities. I confirm in
Appendix B that vacancy-unemployment ratios are indeed larger in skilled markets, using data
from the Conference Board.
What is the impact on search effort? Consider first the decision of firms. Substituting the
first order condition (18) into (20) gives:
rV =
1
2
gaLa2L (28)
Notice that 12gaLa
2
L is the instantaneous advertising expenditure by individual firms. Since V
is fixed in equilibrium, (28) shows that this expenditure depends only on the advertising cost
gaL, and not on the productivity parameters. Intuitively, firms exhaust the rents from the larger
surplus through entry, as manifested by tighter labor markets, and not through advertising.20
Having said that, I show in Appendix D that vacancy durations must be longer when surpluses
are larger (as markets are tighter21), so firms do spend more on advertising over the life of each
vacancy. I also present evidence in Appendix B from employer surveys that skilled vacancy
durations are longer, with more human resource hours invested.
In contrast, the number of workers is fixed by assumption; so they do increase their instan-
taneous search expenditure in response to larger surpluses. To see this, substitute the worker’s
first order condition (17) into (19):
rU˘ =
1
2
gsLs2L (29)
where 12gsLs
2
L is total search expenditure. I have shown above that U˘ is increasing in y¯ b and
s , so the same must be true of sL. This effect is driven fundamentally by the larger expected
surplus and amplified by the increase in q . I present supporting evidence on workers’ search
20In a world where entry is somewhat restricted, the effect on market tightness will be smaller, and firms will
spend more on advertising as the expected surplus grows.
21As I show in the Appendix, this dominates any countervailing influence of increasing search intensity and
match acceptance probability.
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effort from the CPS in Appendix B.
Finally, I study the impact on the job finding rate r . Equation (22) shows r is a function of
(1) firms’ advertising intensity, (2) workers’ search intensity, (3) market tightness and (4) the
job acceptance probability. The final three are increasing in y¯  b, and therefore so is r . But,
the overall effect of s and d are ambiguous (and depend on the parameter values) because of
the acceptance probability. I leave the complete derivations to Appendix D, but the intuition is
simple to see. Notice the acceptance probability can be expressed as:
1 F (y˜L) = y¯ b+s   rU˘  rV¯2s (30)
=
s
r+d
s
ˆ
y
max{S (y) ,0}dF
This is increasing in the expected surplus, all else equal. But controlling for the expected
surplus, it is decreasing in s and increasing in d . This is because the valuations of individual
jobs become more dispersed with larger s and longer job tenures, so workers have an incentive
to hold out for a better match.
In practice, as Table 1 shows, better educated workers do benefit from higher job finding
rates. So, in comparing skill groups, the overall impact of the expected surplus on r dominates
any countervailing influence of growing match dispersion.
3.2 Impact on job-motivated migration
To study the impact on migration, I bring back the national market into the model. The expected
surplus accruing to a random match in market X is:
ˆ
y
max{S (y) mX ,0}dF = 14s (r+d )
⇥
y¯ b+s   rU˘  rV¯   (r+d )mX
⇤2 (31)
where mL = 0 in local markets and mN = m in the national market.
Notice the migration rate µ in (24) can be expressed as a function of (1) the flow of accepted
matches h = drd+r and (2) the odds ratio of national to local job finding
rN
rL :
µ = h rN
r
=
h
1+ rLrN
(32)
How does the flow of accepted matches h vary with education? On the one hand, skilled
workers benefit from higher finding rates r , driven partly by tighter markets and more intensive
search. But as it happens, this is entirely offset in h by longer job tenures (that is, smaller d ). In
Figure 3, I report the annual flow of accepted matches (as a share of all individuals in each cell,
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including the inactive), based on the 2004 panel22 of the SIPP. The flow of matches is larger
among the young, and this can explain much of the age differentials in job-motivated migration
documented in Figure 2.23 But, there is little skill variation within age groups.
Therefore, any variation in mobility across skill groups must be manifested empirically
in the finding rate odds ratio, rNrL . It is simple to show this is increasing in y¯  b and s and
decreasing in d . Notice rNrL can be expressed as a function of the national-local ratios of search
and advertising intensity and acceptance probability; and these in turn are all functions of the
national-local ratio of expected surplus:
rN
rL
=
✓
sN
sL
◆a✓aN
aL
◆1 a 1 F (y˜N)
1 F (y˜L)
 
(33)
=
✓
gsL
gsN
◆a✓ gaL
gaN
◆1 a "´
ymax{S (y) m,0}´
ymax{S (y) ,0}
# 3
2
=
✓
gsL
gsN
◆a✓ gaL
gaN
◆1 a "
1  m
2
s
r+d
s
1´
ymax{S (y) ,0}dF
#3
Clearly, sNsL ,
aN
aL ,
1 F(y˜N)
1 F(y˜L) and
rN
rL are all decreasing in the cross-city matching cost m. But the
job surplus also matters. The final line of equation (33) shows all these national-local ratios are
increasing in the expected surplus from a local match,
´
ymax{S (y) ,0}dF . And so, given the
results above, these ratios must also be increasing in y¯  b and s and decreasing in d . Notice
that y¯ b, s and d have a larger impact if m is larger.24
Intuitively, larger surpluses make the fixed cost m increasingly inconsequential. So, the
gap between national and local search intensity narrows; and relatively more national market
matches are consummated. In the particular case of the separation rate d , the fixed cost m is
more likely to discourage cross-city matches if job tenures are expected to be short.
3.3 Migratory response to local shock
So far, I have considered the impact of aggregate-level parameter changes on gross migration.
Next, I consider the migratory response to a local shock: how does this response vary with the
expected job surplus? Based on (22), the rate of national market job finding rN j for workers of
origin j is:
22This covers the period from February 2004 until January 2008. I exclude self-employed jobs from this anal-
ysis; and when an individual has multiple jobs, I restrict attention to the “primary” job, as defined by monthly
earnings.
23I have not seen this fact documented elsewhere.
24In particular, if m = 0, the ratio rNrL would be invariant to y¯ b, s and d , even if search costs were relatively
large in the national market. In such a world, agents would be indifferent ex post between a national and local
match (all else equal). Larger surpluses would then have no effect on the relative value of national and local
matches - and thus no effect on the relative search intensity or match acceptance probability.
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rN j = sN j
✓
a¯N
s¯N
qN
◆1 a ⇥
1 F  j
 
y˜N j
 ⇤
(34)
=
f
gasNg
1 a
aN
✓
1 f
f
qN
◆1 a ˆ
y
max
⇢
y  rUj  rV¯
r+d  j
 m,0
 
dF  j ·
⇥
1 F  j
 
y˜N j
 ⇤
where a¯N and s¯N are the average firms’ and workers’ search intensities in the national market,
and qN is the national market tightness. F  j and d  j are the match productivity distribution and
separation rate respectively outside city j. And finally,Uj is the unemployment value of origin
j workers, and y˜N j is their cutoff for accepting a national market job.
In this exercise, I study the response of rN j to a shock to Uj (driven by a change in local
productivity or job separation), taking parameters in other cities F  j and d  j as given. Since
there are many cities, I assume that a¯N , s¯N and qN are unaffected by the local shock. To ease the
exposition, I assume an initial equilibrium where all cities are identical: that is, the equilibrium
described in Section 2 above. Imposing the same uniform distribution of match productivity as
above, rN j can be expressed as:
rN j =
f
gasNg
1 a
aN
✓
1 f
f
qN
◆1 a ⇥y¯+s   rUj  rV¯   (r+d )m⇤3
8s2 (r+d )
(35)
And differentiating with respect toUj:
drN j
drUj
=   f
gasNg
1 a
aN
✓
1 f
f
q
◆1 a 3⇥y¯+s   rUj  rV¯   (r+d )m⇤2
8s2 (r+d )
(36)
=   3f
2gasNg
1 a
aN s
✓
1 f
f
q
◆1 a ˆ
y
max{S (y) m,0}dF
The response is of course negative. Clearly, all else equal, the impact on rN j is decreasing in
the national matching costm. Indeed, much of the literature has attributed the spatially inelastic
supply of low skilled labor to high moving costs (see e.g. Bound and Holzer, 2000; Wozniak,
2010).
But, this empirical fact can also be explained by the job surplus. As equation (36) shows, for
given match dispersion s , drN jdrUj is increasing in the expected surplus. This is for three reasons.
First, for given s , larger surpluses are associated with a larger job acceptance probability. Sec-
ond, larger surpluses generate a tighter national market (larger q), which yields more potential
cross-city matches for origin j workers. And third, larger surpluses encourage more intensive
search by both workers and firms in the national market.25 As a result, local workers are more
25It is simple to show that both workers’ and firms’ national search intensity is increasing in the expected
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likely to respond to a decline inUj by taking up work in other cities.
Notice though that an aggregate change in match dispersion s has an ambiguous impact
on the the migratory response drN jdrUj . Intuitively, while the expected surplus is increasing in
s , a given change in the outside option Uj will have a smaller effect on the job acceptance
probability (for given expected surplus). Without knowledge of the precise parameter values, it
is not clear which effect dominates. But certainly, skill differences in drN jrdUj can theoretically be
explained by job surplus alone, without resorting to skill differences in m.
4 Empirical evidence
4.1 Evidence on moving costs
The model offers two possible explanations for the skill mobility gap: differences in moving
costs or job surplus. I next attempt to discriminate between these using evidence from the PSID
and the SIPP.
Since the study began in 1968, the PSID has asked respondents why they changed residence.
Also, between 1970 and 1980, there were more detailed questions about migration intentions
which give some indication of moving costs. In the 1970-80 sample, qualitative patterns among
household heads26 in job-motivated migration by age and education27 (in the first panel of
Figure 4) are similar to those of recent years (as reported in Figure 1 above, based on the
CPS).28
Below, I compare subjective willingness to move (and imputed moving costs) across skill
groups. In making these comparisons, it is first necessary to confirm the low skilled are realistic
about their limited job-motivated migration prospects. This is the purpose of the second panel
of Figure 4. The PSID asks: “Do you think you might move in the next couple of years?” and
“Why might you move?” Based on the responses, I plot the share of respondents who claim
they might make a job-motivated move. The patterns clearly reflect the migration outcomes
depicted in the first panel. This yields some credibility to the analysis which follows.
surplus. Substituting (17) into (19) gives: rU˘ = 12 ÂX gsX s
2
X , which is a version of (29) including the national
market. Similarly, for firms: rV¯ = 12 ÂX gaXa
2
X . Given that (1) the national-local search intensity ratios
sN
sL
and aNaL
are increasing in the expected surplus (see (33)) and (2) neither of rU˘ and rV¯ contract, it must be that both sN and
aN grow.
26Household heads in the PSID are always male, unless there is no husband (or cohabiting partner) present or
the husband is too ill to respond to the survey.
27Given the relatively small samples of the PSID, I have collapsed those with undergraduate and postgraduate
education into a single category in Figure 4.
28Migration rates in Figure 4 (PSID 1970-80) are somewhat higher than in Figure 1 (CPS 1999-2013). This is
for two reasons. First, Figure 1 reports cross-county rates, while Figure 4 includes within-county job-motivated
moves also. Based on the CPS, cross-county moves account for about two-thirds of all job-motivated moves.
And second, migration rates have declined since the 1980s. This has been documented by, for example, Molloy,
Smith and Wozniak (2011). Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012) argue the trend is driven by a decline in the
geographical specificity of returns to occupations, together with improving communications technology. I show
in Appendix A that CPS and PSID time series of job-motivated migration are quantitatively consistent.
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In the years 1970-2 and 1979-80, employed respondents to the PSID were asked: “Would
you be willing to move to another community if you could get a good job there?” Unemployed
respondents were asked the same question in all years between 1970 and 1980 excluding 1976.
Also, in most of these years29, those who answered affirmatively were asked: “How much
would a job have to pay for you to be willing to move?”
In interpreting the responses, it helps to set out a simple model. Let wMi be the minimum
wage required to tempt a worker i to move, and let mi be a one-off individual-specific moving
cost. Then, for an employed worker, wMi satisfies:
E
 
wMi
 
= E (wi)+mi (37)
where wi is the worker’s current wage, and E (w) is the discounted value of a job paying wage
w. This is a reformulation of the job acceptance decision embedded in equation (4), for workers
engaged in on-the-job search. In this simplified version, I have expressed the employment value
as a function of wages wi rather than productivity yi. Workers only disclose their reservation
wage wMi if:
wMi  wGi (38)
where wGi is what worker i expects to earn in a “good job”. Of course, the definition of a “good
job” is entirely subjective.30 But, it seems reasonable to assume wGi approximates the best wage
that can be “realistically” attained, so workers with wMi > w
G
i face only a remote probability of
moving.
As it happens, the share of heads who are willing to move for a “good job” does not vary
systematically with education. This is illustrated in Figure 5. I plot responses separately by
employment status. 50 percent of employed and 73 percent of unemployed workers answer
yes: intuitively, the latter are more willing to bear the cost of moving.31 Notice also that older
workers are less willing to move, and this can help explain the age differentials in mobility
(together with differences in job churn reported in Figure 3). But, despite this intuitive variation
by work status and age, there is no such variation by education. In Table 2, I disaggregate those
unwilling to move by reported reason. The most common reasons are family/location ties and
financial; and together with age/health reasons, these account for the bulk of the age differences.
However, with the exception of health, none of these categories exhibit substantial variation by
education.
Next, I impute moving costs for workers who disclose wMi . For simplicity, suppose the
current job value E (wi) can be expressed as wir+d , where r is the discount rate and d the job
29Excluding 1979-80 for the employed.
30Clearly, if respondents were offered a million dollar salary, the vast majority would move.
31In the context of equation (37), for unemployed workers, the reservation wage for a long-distance move wMi
satisfies E
 
wMi
 
=U +mi, whereU is the value of unemployment. Unemployed workers will be more willing to
move ifU < E (wi).
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separation rate. Then, for workers with wMi  wGi , the one-off moving cost mi can be imputed
as w
M
i  wi
r+d . The numerator, w
M
i  wi, is the flow-equivalent cost over the duration of the job.
In Figure 6, I plot the distribution of wMi  wi in hourly wage terms for employed heads
aged 25 to 64. I also plot differentials in log wages, that is logwMi   logwi: this may be more
relevant for migration decisions if utility is non-linear. I proxy wi with the average hourly wage
earned over the previous year. Notice there is large variation in imputed moving costs. This
is consistent with findings from Kennan and Walker (2011). Part of the variation however is
presumably driven by reporting error or mismeasurement of the expected wage wi, and this
may explain the large quantity of observations (9 percent) falling below zero.
In Table 3, I report sample means of wMi  wi and logwMi   logwi, by education and age
for employed workers. I also present estimates separately for the unemployed32: these can be
interpreted as the moving cost net of the value of finding work. Given the small samples of
unemployed workers, I use just two education groups (no college and at least some college).
And I omit the education disaggregation entirely for the over-35s: the samples are too small to
be informative.
The average flow-equivalent cost for employed workers is $7.46 or 40 log points. And for
the unemployed, this number is $2.33 or 23 log points: they require less compensation for a
long-distance move. These costs vary little with age, conditional on being willing to move.
More importantly, Table 3 suggests they vary little with education, whether costs are measured
in dollar or log terms. An exception is the 45-64 age group (in which college graduates face rel-
atively low costs), though the 45-64s account for little of the mobility gap overall. Of course,
the standard errors which accompany these estimates are large, but the results are still com-
pelling. My interpretation is predicated on the assumption that lower skilled workers do not
systematically overstate their willingness to move. And to this end, I rely on the evidence in
the second panel of Figure 4.
To derive the one-off cost mi =
wMi  wi
r+d , the estimates in Table 3 must be discounted at rate
r+ d . Consider a simple calibration. The average hourly dollar wage gap (wMi  wi) is $7.46
for the employed. Given a sample average of 190 working hours per month, the monthly
equivalent is $1,420. Moving to the denominator, Shimer (2012) estimates a month-to-month
job separation rate of about 0.04 in the 1970s. Since the monthly interest rate is negligible in
comparison, I approximate r+d as 0.04. This suggests an average one-of cost mi of $35,500,33
among workers who are willing to move if offered a “good job”.34
32As with the employed, I proxy wi with the average hourly wage over the previous year. Consequently, my
unemployment sample necessarily excludes those workers reporting no earnings over the previous year.
33How does this compare with moving cost estimates in the literature? Bayer and Juessen (2012) estimate a
cross-state moving cost of $34,000, using a dynamic structural model. And based on a calibrated Roy model,
Lkhagvasuren (2014) suggests a cost of crossing census divisions of between $28,000 and $54,000. Kennan
and Walker (2011) find a much larger average (unconditional) cost of $312,000, though the cost for people who
actually move is typically negative: this is because most moves are motivated by idiosyncratic amenity payoffs,
which Kennan and Walker factor into the cost. It should be emphasized that my estimate relates to hypothetical
job-motivated moves, based on the sample of individuals who are willing to move for a “good job”.
34It is well known that job separation rates are larger for low skilled workers (see Table 1 above). But, this
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Given that these results are based on the subjective judgments of respondents, there may be
doubts over accuracy. But, the cost measures do have significant predictive power for future
migration decisions. Consider the following empirical model. Suppose the instantaneous job-
motivated migration rate µ (xi) of an individual with characteristics xi is invariant over time
and can be expressed as exp(x0ib ), where xi is a vector of covariates including a subjective cost
measure, lagged by one year. DefineMti as a binary indicator taking 1 if the individual i moves
before time t . The probability of moving before t is:
Pr(Mti = 1, t < t|X) = 1  exp
  exp x0ib t  (39)
I normalize t to one year in this exercise, to correspond with the PSID data interval. Equa-
tion (39) is a complementary log-log model, and the vector b can be estimated by maximum
likelihood. The advantage of this model is that the estimates have an intuitive interpretation:
b defines the log point change in the migration rate µ (xi), for a given change in xi. This
interpretation is independent of the time t associated with the migration variable.
Of course, the cost measure in the xi vector may be correlated with the wage offer distri-
bution facing workers, which clearly influences migration decisions. In an attempt to address
this problem, I include a range of controls in xi which can partially proxy for wage offers: em-
ployment status (lagged by one year), a set of demographic controls35, fixed effects denoting
the individual’s census division of residence one year ago, and year fixed effects.
I report results in Table 4 separately by lagged employment status. Based on column 1,
a (binary) stated willingness to move adds 101 log points to the job-motivated migration rate
the following year. Column 4 shows that a $10 increase in the dollar imputed cost adds 24
log points to the migration rate. And column 7 identifies an elasticity of the migration rate
to the log imputed cost of -0.52. In the conditional sample, the effects are much larger for
the unemployed, presumably because employed workers are not necessarily seeking a new job.
The key point to take from this table is that the moving cost estimates do have predictive power.
4.2 Evidence on job surplus
If moving costs do not explain the skill mobility gap in Figure 4, what does? Subjective re-
sponses to another PSID question point to the job surplus. In the 1976 wave (alone), employed
workers were asked: "Are there better jobs you could get if you were willing to move and live
somewhere else?" Since the question conditions on willingness to move, it speaks to job quality
rather than costs.
I report results by education in Table 5. There are three possible answers to the question:
yes, no or do not know. 50 percent of college graduates responded affirmatively, compared with
suggests the statistics in Table 3 underestimate the one-off moving costs for low skilled workers, relative to the
high skilled.
35Specifically: age, age squared, four education indicators (high school graduate, some college, undergraduate
and postgraduate), and gender and black dummies.
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29 percent of high school dropouts. Interestingly, skilled workers also have better information:
14 percent of college graduates cannot answer, compared to 28 percent of high school dropouts.
This suggests mobility differences can be explained by both the availability of quality matches
and information on those matches. This is consistent with the model’s predictions, as well as
the evidence in Appendix B on search intensity and market tightness.
Job surplus can also be studied using wage realizations. Consider worker i’s return on the
surplus (or flow-equivalent surplus), conditional on accepting a job. This can be expressed as
the gap between the accepted and reservation wage, wi wRi . Unfortunately, survey data on
reservation wages is sparse.36 But, a useful proxy for the surplus is the variance over wages in
an individual worker’s history. Intuitively, if a worker is willing to accept a broader range of
wages, he must be receiving a larger surplus on average.
In particular, suppose the wage offer distribution facing worker i is uniform, with a worker-
specific and time-invariant range of
⇥
wmini ,w
max
i
⇤
. And suppose the reservation wage wRi is also
time-invariant, with wRi 2
 
wmini ,w
max
i
 
. Then, for individual i, the variance in (accepted) wages
over time t is:
Vari
 
wit |wit   wRi
 
=
1
12
 
wmaxi  wRi
 2 (40)
This is an increasing function of the maximum flow-equivalent surplus wmaxi  wRi (and hence
expected surplus) accruing to the worker. Given my distributional assumptions, the variance
must therefore be increasing in both y¯  b and s , the mean match productivity (net of out-of-
work-income) and dispersion respectively.
However, this variance may not be a good measure of surplus if there are worker-specific
trends in wmaxi and w
R
i . One approach is to remove worker-specific linear time trends by esti-
mating:
wit = ai+bit+ eit (41)
for each worker by OLS, and studying worker-specific variances in the residuals eit . In this
case, the variance formula (40) will still be correct if wmaxi and w
R
i are subject to common
worker-specific linear trends, such that Dwmaxit = DwRit = bi. Then, conditional on accepting a
job, worker i’s flow-equivalent surplus wi wRi will be subject to a uniform distribution with
range
⇥
0,wmaxi  wRi
⇤
, so Vari
 
eit |wit   wRi
 
= 112
 
wmaxi  wRi
 2.
Should this variance be estimated over dollar wages or logarithms? In the model above, I
assume linear utility; so larger surpluses in dollar terms are sufficient to ensure larger mobil-
ity.37 But, in other settings, a log specification might be more appropriate; and indeed, this
36The PSID does record reservation workers of unemployed workers between 1980 and 1987, but I have found
the samples are too small for statistical inference.
37As well as being analytically simpler, this approach has some foundation in the literature: Grogger and
Hanson (2011) show that a Roy model with linear utility and skill-invariant migration costs can better explain
the observed selection of high and low skilled migrants across countries than an alternative specification with
log utility and migration costs which are proportional to income. However, it is not clear whether this result for
international migration is generalizable to internal migration in the US.
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is standard in the earnings process literature. In any case, I show the results are qualitatively
robust to this specification choice.
Of course, there is already a mature literature on earnings processes, and several studies
have estimated these separately by education. The focus is usually on changes in earnings
instability over time, distinguishing between permanent and transitory components. In the
simplest specification, implemented by Gottschalk et al. (1994), the permanent component is
estimated as an individual’s average earnings over an extended period; and transitory earnings
are the log deviation from this mean. In the empirical model in equation (40), I am effectively
identifying job surplus with the “transitory earnings” variance of this literature.
The evidence has been mixed on whether transitory earnings instability is increasing in
skill.38 But, Fitzgerald (1999) shows that better educated workers face much larger transitory
instability in hourly wage rates (as opposed to monthly earnings). And the hourly wage rate
is the relevant variable for my application, as it describes the value of jobs to workers (when
in employment). Since this result may not be widely known, I present similar findings here.
For this purpose, I use the 2004 panel of the SIPP, covering the period from February 2004
until January 2008.39 I construct a longitudinal data set using reported wages40 at the end
(specifically the final month) of each four-month wave.41
In Figure 7, I plot averages of the worker-specific wage variances (with wages in dollar
terms) across individuals, within education and age groups. The first panel reports estimates
for basic wage variances, and the second panel after extracting worker-specific trends. In each
panel, there is a steep positive education gradient, ranging from under $10 (on average) for high
school dropouts to over $50 or $30 for postgraduates, in the basic and detrended specifications
respectively. The effect of education is larger for younger workers, though only when moving
from undergraduate to postgraduate level.
These large effects for dollar wages are perhaps unsurprisingly, given that wages are sig-
nificantly higher for skilled workers. But, as I show in Figure 8, there is also a strong positive
38Gottschalk et al. (1994) find that lower skilled workers in the PSID faced larger transitory fluctuations in the
1970s and 1980s; though this pattern was reversed thereafter (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 2009).
39Fitzgerald (1999) also takes his data from the SIPP, though covering the 1980s and early 1990s. For my
purposes, the SIPP has three attractive features. First, it is nationally representative. Second, the samples are
very large: the 2004 panel covers 132,000 individuals. In comparison, the PSID covered 9,000 families in its
latest wave; and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) followed 13,000 individuals. And third, the
SIPP waves are just four months apart (waves are annual in the PSID and NLSY). This is useful in years with job
changes, and it should also reduce the measurement error attributable to memory recall.
40My sample consists of employees aged 25 to 64 and still working in the final week of the wave. I exclude
those with second jobs or businesses. I use hourly wage data for workers paid by the hour, and I impute hourly
wages for salaried workers using monthly earnings and hours. Finally, I drop wage observations under $5 in 2000
prices and top-coded values, as well as any remaining observations over $100. Top-coded values account for 3
percent of the remaining sample.
41Respondents to the SIPP do report monthly changes in earnings, but I do not exploit this variation. This
monthly data is likely to be subject to large measurement error due to poor recall, as information is only collected
at the end of each 4-month wave. In particular, it is known that the SIPP suffers from severe seam bias (see e.g.
Marquis and Moore, 2010): monthly changes in individuals’ outcomes (whether employment status or wages)
tend to be larger between months at the seam of two waves than between months within the same wave.
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gradient for variances over log wages. The variances are about twice as large for postgraduates
compared to dropouts in both the basic and detrended specifications, but are similar across age
groups.
4.3 Calibrating the job surplus
Using the variance estimates, it is possible to impute the size of workers’ surplus in different
education groups. Specifically, rearranging equation (40) gives:
wmaxi  wRi =
q
12 ·Vari
 
wit |wit   wRi
 
(42)
Assuming a uniform offer distribution, this can be interpreted as the maximum flow-equivalent
surplus that worker i can receive.
In Panel A of Table 6, I report estimates of the mean of Vari
 
wit |wit   wRi
 
and wmaxi  wRi
across workers aged 25-64 within each education group. The variance estimates are based
on dollar wages, as the assumptions behind equation (42) require this. Based on the basic
wage data (not detrended), the average maximum flow-equivalent surplus ranges from $5 for
dropouts to $16 for postgraduates. The estimates from the detrended specification are slightly
smaller, ranging from $4 to $13. In comparison, the average imputed moving cost from the
PSID is $7.46. While this exceeds the average maximum surplus received by lower skilled
workers, Kennan and Walker (2011) do emphasize that migrants tend to face much lower mov-
ing costs than the average.
Are these surplus differences sufficient to explain the mobility gap? To address this ques-
tion, I calibrate (for each worker) the ex ante relative probability of accepting a national market
offer compared to a local offer, equivalent to 1 F(y˜N)1 F(y˜L) in the model above. Unlike the model, I
allow the productivity distribution F to vary across workers. Let mˆi = (r+d )mi be the flow-
equivalent of the matching cost mi. Again, unlike the model, I assume mˆi is random, drawn
from a distribution M common to all workers (when a national match is made). The relative
acceptance probability (or odds ratio) for worker i is then:
Pr
 
wi  mˆi   wRi
 
Pr
 
wi   wRi
  = ´mˆmax wmaxi  wRi   mˆ,0 dM
wmaxi  wRi
(43)
I calibrate the distributionM in the following way. I assume a worker draws an infinite matching
cost with probability 0.5, commensurate with the proportion of employed individuals in the
PSID who are reportedly unwilling to move for a “good job” (see the first panel of Figure 5).
And with probability 0.5, mˆi is drawn from the dollar moving cost distribution in Figure 6.
I report estimates of the mean odds ratio (43) across workers, by education group, in
columns 5 and 6. Results are very similar for the basic and detrended variance specifications.
The odds ratio ranges from about 0.1 for dropouts to 0.2 for postgraduates. That is, dropouts
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are on average ten times less likely to accept a national match compared to a local one, and
postgraduates five times less likely.
To check whether these numbers of reasonable, I compare these odds ratios with the relative
propensities of national and local job finding, rNrL . Notice from equation (33) that these ratios
are not the same: the relative search intensity sNsL also matters for
rN
rL , though
sN
sL is unobserved.
I present estimates of rNrL by education in Panel B. These are computed from (1) the job-
motivated migration rate µ = rNdr+d and (2) the flow of all accepted matches h =
rd
r+d , reported
in the first two columns. The relative finding rate rNrL , in column 3, is equal to
µ
h µ . I estimate
µ and h for individuals aged 25-64 in the CPS 1999-2013 and SIPP 2004 samples respectively,
following the procedures outlined in the notes under Figures 2 and 3.
rN
rL ranges from 0.05 for dropouts to 0.16 for postgraduates. Therefore, skill differences in
my estimates of the job acceptance odds ratio (in Panel A) can explain the bulk of the variation
in rNrL .
42 Of course, my estimates of the job surplus in national and local matches are based
on some brave assumptions. But, this back-of-the-envelope calibration does suggest the skill
gradient in the job surplus (as estimated from observed wage processes) can plausibly generate
the mobility gap observed in the data. This lends some credibility to my hypothesis.
4.4 Evidence from disaggregated reasons for moving
Until now, I have focused my attention on job-motivated mobility. I show here that a more de-
tailed disaggregation of reported reasons for moving can provide further (suggestive) evidence
for the job surplus explanation.
Table 7 presents estimates from complementary log-log models for annual incidence of
cross-county migration, by reported reason. The empirical model takes the form of equation
(39), with the xi controls consisting of education indicators, year effects and a detailed range
of demographic characteristics.43 The reported b coefficients give the log point effect of a
particular level of education on the instantaneous migration rate, relative to high-school dropout
(the omitted category). For simplicity, I pool all age groups (25-64) together.
There are two pieces of evidence which are of particular interest to the surplus/cost debate.
The most stark is the patterns in speculative migration. Among job-motivated moves (columns
2-5), the positive skill gradient is almost entirely driven by those moving for a new job or
transfer: such moves account for two thirds of job-motivated migration (see the bottom row),
and the effect of education is particularly large.44 But interestingly, higher skilled workers
42Since my estimates of rNrL are smaller than the job acceptance odds ratios, this would imply
sN
sL
lies below 1
(based on equation (33)). Also, since rNrL is somewhat more steeply increasing in education than the job acceptance
odds ratio, this would suggest sNsL is larger in skilled markets, though the effect is small. But, these results should
be interpreted in the light of the strong assumptions underlying this exercise.
43Specifically: age, age squared, black and Hispanic race dummies, immigrant status, marital status, a range
of indicators for number of own children, and a gender indicator which is also interacted with all previously
mentioned variables.
44Commuting-motivated moves also have a positive education slope, though the effect is smaller than for new
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are less likely to move to look for work (speculatively, without a job in hand): a postgraduate
education reduces the speculative migration rate by 58 log points, relative to dropouts.
This result may appear puzzling, but it is entirely consistent with skill differences in ex-
pected job surplus. Skilled mobility is enabled by large surpluses, which fund cross-city search
by both firms and workers. Low skilled workers on the other hand, facing large local em-
ployment disparities and meager investment in cross-city search, are forced to make (costly)
speculative moves. Their engagement in this risky strategy (rather than cross-city search) is tes-
tament to the relatively poor integration of national markets. While I have excluded speculative
moves from the model above, I sketch an extension illustrating these mechanisms in Appendix
C.
The second piece of evidence is the negative skill gradients in non-job migration. This
is somewhat visible in the unconditional migration rates of Figure 2, but the effect is much
stronger once I control for demographic characteristics (and this is true for all age groups, as I
show in Appendix A). These negative effects appear in migration motivated by family, housing
and neighborhood quality.45
If the mobility gap were driven by costs, this negative skill slope might seem strange. But
again, it is a natural consequence of the surplus explanation. The large surpluses in skilled
markets are more resilient to amenity shocks of a given size, so skilled workers are less likely
to break these matches for non-job reasons. I sketch an extension to the model with non-job
migration in Appendix C.
On the other hand, low skilled workers may also face larger family, housing and amenity
shocks. For example, they tend to be more credit constrained, so housing costs may be a more
important contributor to migration decisions. Or they may suffer more from family instability
(see e.g. McLanahan, 1985).
5 Conclusion
Low skilled workers make fewer long-distance moves, and they are less likely to migrate fol-
lowing slumps in local demand. I argue that the obstacles to low skilled mobility are exactly
those which impede low skilled job finding more generally: a small expected job surplus, irre-
spective of geography. These small surpluses have a particularly debilitating effect on cross-city
search intensity and job finding.
I have outlined a cross-city matching model to illustrate these mechanisms. The model
offers two explanations for the mobility gap: differences in moving costs or expected surplus,
arising from mean productivity (net of welfare income), match dispersion or job tenure. I reject
jobs.
45The CPS does provide more disaggregated categories of reasons for moving. I show in Appendix A that the
negative non-job skill gradients are largely driven by the categories labeled “other family reasons”, “other housing
reasons” and “cheaper housing”.
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the costs hypothesis, based on evidence from the PSID: self-reported willingness to accept
long-distance job offers is invariant with skill. However, I report large skill differences in
expected surplus, based on observed wage processes. And given the moving costs I impute
from the PSID, these surplus differences are quantitatively sufficient to explain the mobility
gap. These conclusions are also consistent with patterns in speculative and non-job migration.
Steep cross-city search costs in low skilled markets are an endogenous outcome of the
model, as firms invest fewer resources in seeking match partners. But, this is just one symptom
of the underlying problem of meager returns to work. In this sense, the issue of low skilled
immobility is intimately tied to broader concerns about high rates of joblessness, loose mar-
kets and limited search effort. These findings suggest that policy interventions which address
migration costs exclusively (such as relocation vouchers) may only have a limited effect on
employment.
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Tables and figures
Table 1: Job transition rates (%), over 4 month intervals
FINDING SEPARATION
Unemp Inactive Emp Emp to Emp to
to emp to emp to emp unemp inactive
HS dropout 34.52 6.43 9.92 2.24 3.84
HS graduate 40.66 8.43 9.04 1.49 2.90
Some college 42.34 10.48 9.09 1.33 2.55
Undergraduate 45.43 11.66 8.12 0.79 2.15
Postgraduate 45.35 13.41 7.46 0.54 1.73
This table reports job finding rates by education for individuals aged 25 to
64 in the SIPP panel of 2004. "Unemp (inactive) - Emp" is the percentage
of unemployed (inactive) workers at the end of wave t-1 who are employed
at the end of wave t (four months later). "Emp - emp" is the percentage of
workers, employed at the end of t-1, who left their primary job and found
new work in t. A primary job is the wage/salary job paying the most in
monthly earnings; self-employed jobs are excluded from this definition. The
total sample amount to 405,000 observations.
Table 2: Disaggregation of those unwilling to move by reported reason
Unwilling By reported reason for separation: Observations
to move Family/location ties Financial Age/health Other Not recorded
Education
HS dropout 50.67 29.75 10.49 5.56 3.14 1.75 7,115
HS graduate 46.54 27.65 10.68 3.39 3.31 1.51 5,815
Some college 43.60 26.73 9.59 2.76 2.89 1.64 2,390
College graduate 46.14 27.77 9.57 1.94 4.23 2.62 2,919
Age group
25-34 33.66 22.02 7.53 0.14 2.66 1.31 7,171
35-44 48.35 30.67 11.18 0.89 3.85 1.75 4,465
45-64 62.39 33.64 12.64 10.04 3.71 2.35 6,603
In the 1970s, the PSID asked individuals: "Would you be willing to move to another community if you could earn more money
there?" In this table, I report the percentage responding negatively, and disaggregate these individuals by their stated reason
for being unwilling to move. Statistics in this table are pooled across employed and unemployed individuals. These questions
were posed to the employed in the waves of 1970-2 and 1979-80, and to the unemployed in every wave between 1970 and 1980
excluding 1976. The column labelled "not recorded" refers to the small number of individuals who claim to be unwilling to
move, but who are coded as N/A for the reason why; these include retirees, students and housewives, among others.
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Table 3: Flow-equivalent cost moving costs (in hourly wage terms)
Employed Unemployed
All HS HS Some Coll All Non-coll Coll
d/out grad coll grad
Aged 25-34
Dollar gap ($ 2000) 7.83 6.97 8.01 8.07 8.61 2.33 2.13 3.16
(7.76) (6.60) (7.21) (10.45) (7.86) (8.12) (8.28) (7.45)
Log gap 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.23 0.23 0.22
(0.37) (0.37) (0.35) (0.43) (0.36) (0.49) (0.50) (0.46)
Observations 1,329 400 459 197 273 402 323 79
Aged 35-44
Dollar gap ($ 2000) 7.61 7.00 7.76 7.98 8.83 2.53 - -
(7.87) (6.82) (6.96) (10.11) (10.19) (5.76)
Log gap 0.40 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.25 - -
(0.35) (0.34) (0.33) (0.38) (0.40) (0.43)
Observations 956 433 276 93 154 133 - -
Aged 45-64
Dollar gap ($ 2000) 6.86 6.21 8.21 9.93 4.38 2.12 - -
(8.24) (6.95) (8.26) (9.82) (10.67) (8.64)
Log gap 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.20 0.21 - -
(0.39) (0.39) (0.37) (0.45) (0.32) (0.49)
Observations 1,044 562 254 106 122 135 - -
This table reports mean imputed migration costs by age, education and employment status; standard errors
are in parentheses. Within each cell, I present two alternative estimates of the imputed cost. The first is the
"dollar gap", equivalent to wMi  wi, where wMi is the minimum hourly wage required to tempt a worker i
to take a job in another city, and wi is the worker’s average hourly wage in the previous 12 months (with
wages expressed in 2000 dollars). The "log gap" is the log difference between the reservation and current
wage: logwMi   logwi. For employed workers, I report mean imputed costs for five education groups: high
school dropout, high school graduate, some college, undergraduate and postgraduate. For the unemployed,
I report just two groups (no college and at least some college) because samples are smaller; and I omit the
disaggregation entirely for the over-35s because the college-educated unemployed samples are two small
to be informative. The sample consists of employed household heads aged 25-64 in the PSID waves of
1970-2, and unemployed heads in all waves between 1970 and 1980 excluding 1976. Household heads in
the PSID are always male, unless there is no husband (or cohabiting partner) present or the husband is too
ill to respond to the survey. I exclude all workers earning less than $5 or more than $100 per hour (in 2000
dollars) in the previous year; and similarly, I exclude workers whose reported reservation lies below $5 or
above $100. The specific question eliciting the reservation wage is: "How much would a job have to pay
for you to be willing to move?"
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Table 4: Effect of cost measures on job-motivated migration rate
Complementary log-log regressions of job-motivated migration on 1-year lagged cost measures
Unconditional sample Conditional sample: individuals willing to move
Emp status (lagged): All Emp Unemp All Emp Unemp All Emp Unemp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Willing to move (binary) 1.005*** 1.020*** 0.902**
(0.111) (0.116) (0.382)
Dollar gap (imputed cost) -0.024*** -0.022** -0.041**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.021)
Log gap (imputed cost) -0.524** -0.385 -0.909**
(0.207) (0.255) (0.395)
Employed (lagged) -0.547*** -0.548 -0.558
(0.209) (0.352) (0.354)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census div FEs (lagged) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,219 15,815 1,404 3,814 3,205 609 3,814 3,205 609
Job-motivated mig rate 0.029 0.029 0.040 0.047 0.045 0.060 0.047 0.045 0.060
This table reports the impact of (1-year) lagged subjective cost measures on job-motivated migration incidence, based on complementary log-log
regressions. I report results separately for all labor force participants and disaggregated by lagged employment status. I study three subjective
cost measures: the binary indicator of willingness to move (for a "good job"), the dollar gap moving cost, and the log gap moving cost. The
latter two are available only for individuals who report being willing to move. These measures are described in greater detail in the notes under
Figure 5 and Table 3. Coefficients should be interpreted as the log point effect of each measure on the instantaneous job-motivated migration
rate, conditional on the empirical model described by equation (39). The sample consists of household heads aged 25-64 who were employed in
the PSID waves of 1970-2, and who were unemployed in any wave between 1970 and 1980 excluding 1976. Household heads in the PSID are
always male, unless there is no husband (or cohabiting partner) present or the husband is too ill to respond to the survey. The sample is further
restricted for the dollar gap and log gap measures, as described in the notes under Table 3. All specifications control for (1) demographic controls,
specifically age, age squared, four education indicators (high school graduate, some college, undergraduate and postgraduate), and gender, black
and Hispanic dummies; (2) fixed effects denoting the census division of residence one year ago; and (3) year fixed effects. I also control for lagged
employment status in the pooled employment status specifications. Errors are clustered by individual, and robust SEs are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5: Are there better jobs available in other cities?
HS HS Some College
dropout graduate college graduate
Yes 0.294 0.379 0.420 0.495
No 0.431 0.427 0.396 0.368
Don’t know 0.275 0.194 0.184 0.138
Observations 1,134 1,151 450 639
Employed workers in the PSID wave of 1976 were asked:
"Are there better jobs you could get if you were willing to
move and live somewhere else?" In this table, I report the
fraction of respondents answering "yes", "no" and "do not
know". The sample consists of household heads aged 25-64
who are currently employed.
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Table 6: Calibration of surplus and relative probability of accepting national offers
PANEL A: Imputing relative national/local acceptance probability (SIPP)
Mean over dollar wage Mean over maximum Mean over relative N/L Sample
variance, Vari
 
wit |wit   wRi
 
surplus flow, wmaxi  wRi acceptance prob: equ (43)
Basic spec Detrended Basic spec Detrended Basic spec Detrended
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HS dropout 9.74 4.94 4.69 3.50 0.10 0.09 2,476
HS graduate 9.93 6.29 5.97 4.49 0.12 0.10 7,756
Some college 16.12 11.23 7.68 5.92 0.13 0.12 11,520
Undergraduate 33.28 22.77 12.41 9.87 0.17 0.15 6,149
Postgraduate 50.88 34.38 15.83 12.66 0.19 0.17 3,195
This panel imputes the relative national/local job acceptance probability. I first estimate Vari
 
wit |wit   wRi
 
for individual workers,
based on wages recorded at the end of each 4-month wave in the SIPP panel of 2004, separately using the basic wage data and
after extracting worker-specific linear trends. The first two columns report means of these variances across workers within education
groups. For each worker, based on the variance estimates and assuming worker-specific uniform surplus distributions, I calibrate the
maximum surplus using equation (42); and I report means of this maximum surplus across workers in columns 3 and 4. I then calibrate
each worker’s relative national/local acceptance probability using equation (43). This requires knowledge of the distribution of the
flow-equivalent matching cost mˆi = (r+d )mi. As I describe in the main text, I assume that each worker draws an infinite matching
cost with probability 0.5, commensurate with the proportion of employed individuals in the PSID who are reportedly unwilling to
move for a good job (see the first panel of Figure 5). And with probability 0.5, mˆi is drawn from the dollar moving cost distribution in
Figure 6. After computing the relative probabilities for each worker, I report the education group means in columns 5 and 6. Column
7 gives the sample of employees aged 25 to 64 in the SIPP data by education group. See the notes under Figure 7 for further sample
restrictions.
PANEL B: Imputing relative national/local job-finding propensity
Job-motivated cross-county Flow of accepted matches Relative N/L job
migration rate (CPS): µ (SIPP): h finding propensity: rNrL =
µ
h µ
(1) (2) (3)
HS dropout 0.010 0.218 0.050
HS graduate 0.011 0.230 0.051
Some college 0.015 0.249 0.064
Undergraduate 0.023 0.231 0.109
Postgraduate 0.027 0.192 0.164
The first column of Panel B reports the annual rate of job-motivated cross-county migration µ among all those aged 25-64
in each education group, based on the CPS sample described in the notes under Figure 2. The flow of accepted matches h
among 25-64s by education is given in column 2, based on the SIPP 2004 panel sample described in the notes under Figure 3.
This is the average number of times a worker of given education is hired for a new job each year. The relative national/local
job finding propensity, reported in column 3 is a function µh µ of the statistics in columns 1 and 2.
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Table 7: Log point responses of migration rate, by reported reason
ALL JOB REASONS NON-JOB REASONS
New job/ Commute Look for Other job Family Housing Better Climate, health Other
transfer work reasons n/hood retirement reasons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
High-school graduate -0.074*** 0.172** 0.046 -0.351*** 0.047 -0.106** -0.078* -0.138 -0.139 -0.097
(0.025) (0.070) (0.115) (0.114) (0.146) (0.045) (0.045) (0.116) (0.117) (0.150)
Some college 0.008 0.568*** 0.223** -0.409*** 0.203 -0.07 -0.119*** -0.094 -0.071 -0.176
(0.025) (0.068) (0.113) (0.117) (0.145) (0.046) (0.046) (0.117) (0.118) (0.152)
Undergraduate 0.051** 1.026*** 0.282** -0.496*** 0.165 -0.279*** -0.160*** -0.377*** -0.213* -0.029
(0.026) (0.067) (0.116) (0.124) (0.146) (0.049) (0.048) (0.126) (0.128) (0.153)
Postgraduate 0.182*** 1.496*** 0.438*** -0.575*** 0.517*** -0.438*** -0.294*** -0.375*** -0.092 0.059
(0.028) (0.069) (0.125) (0.148) (0.155) (0.058) (0.055) (0.145) (0.138) (0.166)
Migration rate (%) 4.658 1.083 0.273 0.160 0.157 1.236 1.269 0.156 0.180 0.142
This table reports education effects from complementary log-log regressions on annual cross-county migration incidence, by reported reason. Each column reports the
effects on moving for the motivation specified, with the first column presenting effects on the overall migration incidence (all reasons). Coefficients should be interpreted
as the log point effect of a particular level of education (relative to high-school dropout, the omitted category) on the instantaneous migration rate (for the motivation
specificed), conditional on the empirical model described by equation (39). Each regression controls for a detailed set of individual characteristics: age, age squared,
black and Hispanic race dummies, immigration status, marital status, a range of indicators for number of own children, a gender indicator which is also interacted with all
previously mentioned variables, and a set of year fixed effects (for the individual CPS cross-sections). Estimates are based on pooled CPS cross-sections between 1999 and
2013. The sample consists of household heads aged 25-64 and amounts to 900,317 observations in each regression. See the notes under Figure 2 for further details on the
sample. Robust SEs in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1: Annual cross-county migration rates (CPS 1999-2013)
The March CPS reports whether individuals moved county or state in the previous 12 months, and I estimate migration rates based on this
information. My sample is based on household heads in pooled cross-sections between 1999 and 2013. In each household, I define the head
as the individual with the greatest predicted earnings power. Earnings power is predicted using a Mincer regression of log weekly wages on a
detailed set of characteristics. In households with multiple predicted top-earners, I divide the person weights by the number of top-earners. I
exclude individuals who lived abroad one year previously, individuals who report moving primarily to attend or leave college, and those who
report moving because of natural disasters. See Appendix A for further details.
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Figure 2: Annual migration rates by reported reason (CPS 1999-2013)
Between 1999 and 2013, the CPS asked migrants for their primary reason for moving. In the first panel, I report rates of migration for all
job-related reasons; and in the second panel, for all non-job reasons. See Figure 1 notes for sample details.
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Figure 3: Annual flow of accepted matches per individual (SIPP 2004)
This figure reports the average number of times a worker is hired for a new job each year, across all individuals in each age/education cell.
These estimates are based on the 2004 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which covers the period from February
2004 until January 2008. I exclude self-employed jobs from this analysis; and when an individual works has multiple jobs, I restrict attention
to the “primary” job, as defined by monthly earnings.
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Figure 4: Annual job-motivated migration rates: PSID 1970-80
The first panel reports the proportion of household heads moving residence each year for job-related reasons, based on the PSID sample of
1970-80. Using the same sample, the second panel reports the share of heads who both (1) answer affirmatively to the question “Do you think
you might move in the next couple of years?” and (2) report job-related reasons in answer to the question “Why might you move?” Household
heads in the PSID are always male, unless there is no husband (or cohabiting partner) present or the husband is too ill to respond to the survey.
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Figure 5: Share who would move for “good job”: PSID 1970-80
In the years 1970-2 and 1979-80, employed respondents to the PSID were asked: “Would you be willing to move to another community if
you could get a good job there?” Unemployed respondents were asked the same question in all years between 1970 and 1980 excluding 1976.
This figure reports the proportion of households heads responding affirmatively, by employment status, age and education. Household heads
in the PSID are always male, unless there is no husband (or cohabiting partner) present or the husband is too ill to respond to the survey.
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Figure 6: Distribution of flow-equivalent moving costs (hourly wage terms, 2000 $)
This figure plots kernel distributions of imputed flow-equivalent moving costs (in 2000 dollars, inflated by CPI), based on responses of
employed household heads (in the PSID, 1970-2) to the question: “How much would a job have to pay for you to be willing to move?” The
sample excludes those individuals who report being unwilling to move. Household heads in the PSID are always male, unless there is no
husband (or cohabiting partner) present or the husband is too ill to respond to the survey. See notes under Table 3 for further details on the
sample and how the cost measures are constructed.
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Figure 7: Average worker-specific variance over hourly dollar wages (2000 $)
These estimates are based on the SIPP panel of 2004. For each individual, I estimate variances in dollar wages over 4-month waves; and
I report the mean variance within each age/education cell. The first panel uses the basic wage data, and the second uses wages purged of
worker-specific linear time trends. The sample consists of employees still working in the final week of the wave. I exclude those with second
jobs or businesses. I use hourly wage data for workers paid by the hour, and I impute hourly wages for salaried workers using monthly earnings
and monthly hours. Finally, I drop wage observations under $5 in 2000 prices and top-coded values, as well as any remaining observations
over $100.
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Figure 8: Average worker-specific variance over log hourly wages
This figure replicates the exercise of Figure 7, but estimates variances over log wages rather than dollar wages. See notes under Figure 7 for
details on estimation and sample.
Appendices
A Supplementary estimates from the CPS
This appendix presents supplementary estimates on reasons for moving, based on the CPS.
First, I present a disaggregation of cross-county and cross-state migration in the CPS by re-
ported reason. Second, I explore in greater detail how migration rates by reported reason vary
with education, building on Figure 2 and Table 7 in the main text. Third, I disaggregate job-
motivated and non-job migration into net flows across states and residual “excess flows”: I show
the skill gap in job-motivated migration is largely driven by the former, even within detailed
occupation groups. And fourth, I show that CPS and PSID time series on job-motivated migra-
tion are quantitatively consistent. I begin by describing the sample I use for these exercises and
in the main text.
A.1 Sample description
All estimates from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in this study are based on the March
waves, organized by IPUMS (King et al., 2010). The March CPS reports whether respondents
moved county or state in the previous 12 months. Since 1999, individuals have also given their
primary reason for moving. All estimates below are based on pooled cross-sections between
1999 and 2013.
I restrict the sample to individuals aged 25 to 64 who lived in the US for the previous 12
months. Focusing on the over-25s helps ensure my results are not conflated by individuals
leaving college. In any case, I exclude those who explicitly report moving primarily to attend
or leave college: these account for 2 percent of the remaining cross-county migrant sample. I
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also exclude those who report moving because of natural disasters: the majority of these are
responses to Hurricane Katrina.
Importantly, the CPS question on reasons for moving is addressed to individuals within
households. But of course, migration decisions are made in the context of the household. This
ambiguity has resulted in some inconsistencies in the coding of responses: many household
dependents simply report the reasons of the breadwinners.46 My strategy is to restrict the
sample to those individuals with the greatest predicted earnings power in each household: I
define these as “household heads”. This restriction excludes 41 percent of the original sample.
I predict earnings power from a Mincer regression of log weekly wages on a detailed set of
characteristics.47 In households with multiple predicted top-earners, I divide the person weights
by the number of top-earners.48
A.2 Breakdown of migration by reported reasons for moving
Table A1 disaggregates cross-county migration by primary reason for moving, separately for
cross-state and within-state moves. The first column gives the percentage of the full sample
who changed state for each recorded reason, and the second column reports the percentage of
cross-state migrants who moved for each recorded reason. The final two columns repeat this
exercise for cross-county moves within states.
The bottom row shows that, each year, about 2 percent of the sample move across states
and another 2 percent switch county within states. Almost half of cross-state moves are job-
motivated, compared with a third of within-state moves. Job-motivated moves are almost al-
ways driven by the needs of a specific job. Usually, this is due to a job change or transfer; and
among within-state moves, commuting reasons also feature prominently. In contrast, it is rare
to move to look for work without a job lined up. This sort of speculative job search accounts for
just 5 percent of cross-state and 2 percent of within-state moves. This is unsurprising: moving
without a job in hand is a costly and risky strategy. In terms of non-job migration, family and
housing motivations account for most moves.
46This is most clearly visible among children: in households with at least one adult moving for job-related
reasons, 77 percent of under-16s also report moving for job reasons.
47Specifically: age, age squared, four education indicators (each of which are interacted with age and age
squared), black and Hispanic race dummies, immigrant status, marital status, a range of indicators for number of
own children, a gender indicator which is also interacted with all previously mentioned variables, and a set of year
fixed effects (for the individual CPS cross-sections).
48As it happens, this sample restriction makes little difference to the results which follow: this is presumably
because education is correlated across individuals within households. An alternative approach would be to choose
those individuals with the greatest current (rather than predicted) earnings within households. But, this strategy is
not ideal. Firstly, earnings are endogenous to migration itself. And secondly, this restriction would exclude those
households with no current earners from the sample.
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A.3 Skill gradients in job-motivated and non-job migration
Next, I show that the positive skill slope in job-motivated migration and negative slope in non-
job migration (in Figure 2) are robust to individual demographic controls, within each age
group. Specifically, I estimate complementary log-log models for annual incidence of cross-
county migration, of the form of equation (39), on a set of education effects.
The b estimates for the education effects are presented in Table A2. I report results both
with and without a detailed range of demographic controls.49 The reported coefficients give the
log point effect of a particular level of education, relative to high-school dropout (the omitted
category), on the instantaneous migration rate (for the specified motivation).
With regards to job-motivated migration, Table A2 shows there are positive and strongly
significant education effects within each age group. The coefficients change little after con-
trolling for demographic characteristics, though the differences between age groups do narrow.
Among those aged 25-34, a postgraduate education adds 124 log points to the migration rate
(controlling for characteristics), relative to high school dropouts. This effect comes to 98 log
points among the 35-44s, and 74 among the 45-64s. As in Figure 2, moving from high school
dropout to graduate has little effect; but job-motivated rates grow rapidly thereafter.
Next, consider non-job migration. As in Figure 2, in the specification without demographic
controls, the education effects are negative only for the over-35s. But interestingly, after con-
trolling for demographic characteristics, the significant negative effect also extends to the 25-
34s. It turns out this is largely due to controlling for Hispanic heritage: Hispanics tend to make
relatively few non-job moves, despite having relatively low education levels. When demo-
graphic controls are included, the effect of a postgraduate education on the non-job migration
rate (relative to dropouts) varies between 26 and 44 log points across age categories.
A.4 Disaggregated skill gradients
In Table 7 in the main text, I disaggregate the job-motivation and non-job skill gradients into
nine distinct motivations. And in Table A3 in this appendix, I provide an even finer disag-
gregation. Again, I estimate complementary log-log models for migration by reported reason,
of the form of equation (39), on education effects and a range of demographic controls. In
each row of the table, I report education slopes for the individual motivations. I also produce
separate estimates for the incidence of cross-state moves (first four columns) and within-state
cross-county moves (last four columns). I pool all age groups together in each specification.
The first row reports effects for all motivations combined. Interestingly, the positive edu-
cation gradient is only present for cross-state moves and not within-state. Mechanically, this is
for two reasons. First, the positive education slope of job-motivated migration is much steeper
49Specifically: age, age squared, black and Hispanic race dummies, immigrant status, marital status, a range
of indicators for number of own children, and a gender indicator which is also interacted with all previously
mentioned variables.
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for cross-state than within-state moves (see the second row). Second, the negative education
slopes for the various non-job motivations tend to be larger for within-state moves.
A broad range of the non-job motivations exhibit negative skill slopes, which contribute to
the negative education effects reported in Table 7 in the main text. These include establishing
own household, “other family reasons” (which are likely to include proximity to relatives),
cheaper housing, “other housing reasons” and seeking a better neighborhood. There are only
two non-job motivations with significant positive skill slopes: the desire to purchase a home,
and the residual “other reasons” category (across states only).
A.5 Disaggregating migration into net and excess flows
In my model, I assume cities are identical. This rules out the possibility that the mobility gap
is driven by large net flows of skilled workers to particular cities. In this section, I show this
assumption is consistent with the empirical evidence. This finding is not entirely new: Folger
and Nam (1967) and Schwartz (1971), and more recently, Lkhagvasuren (2014), show the ratio
of net to gross migration rates is strongly decreasing in education.50 I show this result is driven
by job-motivated migration in particular, and it also holds for comparisons across detailed
occupation groups (not just broad education groups).
Specifically, I estimate the cross-state net migration rate as 12nS j|ninj  noutj |, where n is the
total sample of individuals, ninj is the number of in-migrants to state j, and n
out
j is the number of
out-migrants from state j. Dividing the expression by 2 ensures that migrants are not double-
counted. Notice the gross migration rate is simply equal to 1nÂ j n
in
j or
1
nÂ j n
out
j .
In Table A4, I report gross and net migration rates separately for job-motivated and non-job
migration, and separately for each education group. As is well known51, net flows are small
relative to gross flows. Next, consider the skill gradients. As shown in the main text, gross job-
motivated migration is strongly increasing in education. But, the skill gradient in net migration
is much flatter: the net-gross ratio falls from 0.26 for high school dropouts to just 0.11 for
postgraduates. Interestingly though, among non-job moves, there is no systematic pattern in
the net-gross ratio.
The evidence in Table A4 shows that net flows within education groups account for only
a small portion of the skill differences in job-motivated mobility. But, this does not rule out
large occupation-specific net flows among college graduates. For example, graduate bankers
might move en masse from California to New York, and graduate computer scientists in the
other direction, yielding small net flows overall.
50Schwartz (1971) criticizes Folger and Nam (1967) on their interpretation of this fact. Following Shryock
(1959), Folger and Nam view the net-gross ratio as reflecting migration “efficiency” (with a small ratio implying
many moves in the “wrong” direction). This claim was disputed by Schwartz, who noted that large gross flows
can be explained by movements up an idiosyncratic wage distribution. He argues that the small net-gross ratio
among skilled workers reflects small local earnings differentials which arise in better integrated markets.
51See, for example, Schwartz (1971); Jackman and Savouri (1992); Wildasin (2000); Coen-Pirani (2010).
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However, I show that the results above also hold within 80 detailed occupation groups.52
In Figure A1, I plot annual net and gross migration rates within each occupation group on its
“skill” percentile, where skill is identified with an occupation’s median wage.53
The first panel presents results for job-motivated and the second for non-job migration.54
Job-motivated gross migration rates increase rapidly after the 30th percentile. But, there is no
systematic pattern in the net rates, except perhaps a small increase around the 90th percentile.
Among non-job moves though, similarly to Table A4, net-gross ratios appear to vary little with
skill.
There is an important caveat in the interpretation of these results. Ideally, I would classify
workers according to their occupation 12 months previously; but unfortunately, this informa-
tion is not reported in the March CPS. Instead, occupations are reported at the time of survey
(immediately after the period in which migration is recorded). This is problematic to the ex-
tent that occupational skill percentile and migration are co-determined. But, the clarity of the
patterns is still compelling.
A.6 Consistency between CPS and PSID
In this study, I have cited evidence from both the CPS and PSID on reported reasons for moving.
In this section, I show estimates of the job-motivated migration rate (the key variable of interest)
are consistent across these surveys. In Figure A2, I plot time series of the share of households
heads55 making job-motivated moves in the previous 12 months, separately for moves of any
distance and cross-state moves.
In the PSID, there has been a clear downward trend since the mid-1980s.56 Notice that the
PSID series is much more volatile: this reflects the smaller sample sizes. Reassuringly though,
the CPS rates (beginning in 1999) have similar magnitude to the PSID rates in the same period.
52These are time-consistent groups constructed by IPUMS, based on the census 1990 coding scheme.
53The percentiles are employment-weighted. Specifically, I line up workers according to their median occu-
pational wage; and I estimate the “skill percentile” as the average percentile of workers (within each occupation
group) along this line.
54I exclude individuals reporting no occupation and those in the armed forces. Individuals in the military are
unusually mobile, with an annual job-motivated migration rate of 10.7 percent, compared to 0.9 percent for other
workers.
55The definition of household heads differs between the PSID and CPS. Household heads in the PSID are always
male, unless there is no husband (or cohabiting partner) present or the husband is too ill to respond to the survey.
In contrast, the CPS might define a husband or wife as the reference person. For the purpose of this exercise, I
construct a PSID-equivalent household head definition in the CPS data. Specifically, I use the CPS’s definitions,
unless there is a female head living with a male partner - in which case I designate the male as the head.
56This has been well documented in the literature: see, for example, Molloy, Smith andWozniak (2011). Kaplan
and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012) argue the trend is driven by a decline in the geographical specificity of returns to
occupations, together with improving communications technology.
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Table A1: Breakdown of migration motivations for individuals aged 25-64
State moves County moves (within states)
Primary reason % full sample % state migrants % full sample % county migrants
JOB-MOTIVATED 0.94 45.31 0.60 28.78
New job or job transfer 0.69 33.23 0.33 15.61
Easier commute 0.07 3.17 0.17 8.21
Looking for work 0.10 4.62 0.05 2.48
Other job-related reasons 0.09 4.30 0.05 2.48
NON-JOB 1.13 54.69 1.49 71.22
Family 0.52 24.87 0.58 27.57
Change in marital status 0.11 5.51 0.18 8.56
Establish own household 0.08 4.05 0.15 6.97
Other family reasons 0.32 15.31 0.25 12.03
Housing 0.40 19.21 0.71 34.17
Want to own home 0.07 3.53 0.17 8.29
New or better housing 0.13 6.34 0.24 11.59
Cheaper housing 0.08 3.71 0.12 5.76
Other housing reasons 0.12 5.63 0.18 8.54
Amenities 0.18 7.49 0.18 6.47
Better neighborhood 0.05 2.47 0.09 4.16
Climate, health, retirement 0.10 5.02 0.05 2.32
Other reasons 0.06 3.12 0.06 3.01
ALL REASONS 2.07 100 2.09 100
This table presents migration rates for individuals aged 25-64, by primary reason in CPS cross-sections between
1999 and 2013. I exclude individuals living abroad in the previous 12 months, and those who migrated primarily
to attend or leave or college or because of natural disasters. The sample is further restricted to the individuals
with the greatest predicted earnings power in each household, where this prediction is based on a Mincer wage
regression. In households with multiple predicted top-eaners, I divide the person weights by the number of top-
earners. The first column reports the percentage of the full sample who changed state, for each given reason, over
the previous twelve months. The second column gives the percentage of state-movers reporting each reason. The
final two columns repeat the exercise for cross-county moves within states.
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Table A2: Log point responses of job-motivated and non-job migration rates
JOB-MOTIVATED NON-JOB
25-34 35-44 45-64 25-34 35-44 45-64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification 1: no demographic controls
High-school graduate 0.135* 0.122 0.012 0.104** -0.082 -0.088*
(0.073) (0.089) (0.087) (0.048) (0.052) (0.046)
Some college 0.422*** 0.397*** 0.275*** 0.116** -0.088* -0.037
(0.071) (0.087) (0.085) (0.047) (0.052) (0.046)
Undergraduate 0.893*** 0.649*** 0.524*** 0.080* -0.242*** -0.231***
(0.069) (0.087) (0.085) (0.048) (0.055) (0.050)
Postgraduate 1.300*** 1.086*** 0.691*** -0.095 -0.384*** -0.330***
(0.072) (0.088) (0.087) (0.059) (0.065) (0.055)
Specification 2: demographic controls
High-school graduate 0.071 0.036 -0.029 -0.013 -0.178*** -0.096**
(0.076) (0.093) (0.089) (0.050) (0.054) (0.048)
Some college 0.353*** 0.324*** 0.241*** -0.042 -0.192*** -0.046
(0.075) (0.092) (0.087) (0.050) (0.056) (0.049)
Undergraduate 0.755*** 0.543*** 0.513*** -0.140*** -0.317*** -0.178***
(0.075) (0.092) (0.088) (0.053) (0.060) (0.053)
Postgraduate 1.241*** 0.983*** 0.737*** -0.256*** -0.440*** -0.256***
(0.079) (0.095) (0.091) (0.064) (0.069) (0.058)
Observations 195,754 264,221 440,342 195,754 264,221 440,342
Migration rate (%) 3.657 1.686 0.811 5.136 3.023 2.039
Each column reports education effects from complementary log-log regressions on job-motivated and non-
job migration incidence across counties. I report results separately for three age groups. Coefficients should
be interpreted as the log point effect of a particular level of education (relative to high-school dropout, the
omitted category) on the instantaneous migration rate, conditional on the empirical model described by
equation (39). Estimates are based on a panel of CPS cross-sections between 1999 and 2013; see the notes
under Table A1 for the sample description. I include results for specifications both with and without detailed
demographic controls: age, age squared, black and Hispanic race dummies, immigration status, marital
status, a range of indicators for number of own children, and a gender indicator which is also interacted with
all previously mentioned variables. All specifications control for a set of year fixed effects (for the individual
CPS cross-sections). Robust SEs in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3: Log point responses of migration rate, by detailed reported reason
CROSS-STATE CROSS-COUNTY WITHIN STATE
Primary reason HS grad Some coll Coll grad Post grad HS grad Some coll Coll grad Post grad
All reasons -0.044 0.047 0.217*** 0.504*** -0.097*** -0.027 -0.090*** -0.139***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.040)
JOB-MOTIVATED
New job/transfer 0.258*** 0.647*** 1.185*** 1.771*** 0.062 0.465*** 0.775*** 0.973***
(0.092) (0.090) (0.089) (0.090) (0.107) (0.104) (0.104) (0.113)
Commute -0.195 0.036 0.046 0.478* 0.118 0.276** 0.369*** 0.434***
(0.231) (0.226) (0.228) (0.244) (0.132) (0.131) (0.133) (0.144)
Look for work -0.306** -0.421*** -0.358** -0.474*** -0.422** -0.408** -0.740*** -0.765***
(0.148) (0.147) (0.151) (0.181) (0.176) (0.189) (0.212) (0.254)
Other job reasons 0.362* 0.535** 0.575*** 1.057*** -0.288 -0.161 -0.296 -0.229
(0.208) (0.209) (0.207) (0.213) (0.206) (0.200) (0.210) (0.239)
NON-JOB
Change in marital status 0.106 0.133 -0.076 -0.113 0.251** 0.411*** 0.081 -0.005
(0.156) (0.158) (0.169) (0.193) (0.127) (0.127) (0.135) (0.151)
Establish own household -0.030 -0.057 0.003 -0.193 -0.237* -0.128 -0.437*** -0.566***
(0.168) (0.169) (0.178) (0.212) (0.122) (0.122) (0.130) (0.162)
Other family reasons -0.296*** -0.250*** -0.345*** -0.523*** -0.113 -0.202** -0.483*** -0.741***
(0.082) (0.083) (0.090) (0.106) (0.087) (0.090) (0.097) (0.122)
Want to own home 0.211 0.139 0.471** 0.548** 0.197 0.373*** 0.542*** 0.291**
(0.195) (0.203) (0.202) (0.223) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) (0.145)
New or better housing 0.053 -0.080 -0.100 -0.190 -0.079 -0.056 -0.101 -0.295**
(0.129) (0.135) (0.144) (0.160) (0.095) (0.096) (0.101) (0.115)
Cheaper housing -0.068 -0.238 -0.635*** -0.528** -0.205* -0.285** -0.588*** -0.863***
(0.168) (0.174) (0.193) (0.223) (0.124) (0.128) (0.140) (0.176)
Other housing reasons -0.057 -0.261* -0.194 -0.217 -0.300*** -0.388*** -0.607*** -0.678***
(0.149) (0.150) (0.154) (0.173) (0.099) (0.102) (0.112) (0.130)
Better neighborhood -0.126 0.031 -0.429** -0.276 -0.141 -0.152 -0.354** -0.424**
(0.196) (0.193) (0.213) (0.240) (0.143) (0.147) (0.155) (0.181)
Climate, health, retirement -0.084 0.131 0.006 0.062 -0.200 -0.439** -0.596*** -0.345
(0.154) (0.154) (0.163) (0.175) (0.180) (0.190) (0.215) (0.232)
Other reasons 0.203 0.135 0.572*** 0.733*** -0.279 -0.371* -0.477** -0.489**
(0.206) (0.212) (0.206) (0.223) (0.200) (0.202) (0.210) (0.235)
This table reports education effects from complementary log-log regressions on annual migration incidence, estimated separately for cross-state
and within-state (cross-county) moves. Each row reports the effects on moving for the motivation specified, with the first row presenting education
effects on the overall migration incidence (all reasons). The first four columns gives results for cross-state migration and the final four for cross-
county migration within states. Coefficients should be interpreted as the log point effect of a particular level of education (relative to high-school
dropout, the omitted category) on the instantaneous migration rate, conditional on the empirical model described by equation (39). Estimates are
based on a panel of CPS cross-sections between 1999 and 2013; see the notes under Table A1 for the sample description. The sample size in each
regression is 900,317. Each regression controls for a detailed set of individual characteristics: age, age squared, black and Hispanic race dummies,
immigration status, marital status, a range of indicators for number of own children, a gender indicator which is also interacted with all previously
mentioned variables, and a set of year fixed effects (for the individual CPS cross-sections). Robust SEs in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table A4: Net cross-state migration rates by education
HS HS Some Under Post
dropout graduate college graduate graduate
Job-motivated
Gross migration rate (%) 0.50 0.58 0.78 1.33 1.84
Net migration rate (%) 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.20
Net-gross ratio 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.11
Non-job
Gross migration rate (%) 1.25 1.19 1.20 1.16 1.00
Net migration rate (%) 0.26 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.19
Net-gross ratio 0.20 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.19
Observations (000s) 90 255 243 197 114
This table reports annual gross and net cross-state migration rates within education
groups, based on the CPS March cross-sections of 1999-2013. See notes under Ta-
ble A1 for sample description. The cross-state net migration rate is estimated as
1
2nS j|ninj   noutj |, where n is the total sample of individuals, ninj is the number of in-
migrants to state j, and noutj is the number of out-migrants from state j. Gross and
net rates are estimated separately for workers who report moving for job-related and
non-job reasons.
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Figure A1: Annual gross and net cross-state migration by occupation
This figure reports annual gross and net cross-state migration rates within 80 occupation groups, based on the CPS March cross-sections of
1999-2013. See notes under Table A1 for sample description. The occupations are time-consistent groups constructed by IPUMS, based on
the census 1990 coding scheme. Within each occupation group, the cross-state net migration rate is estimated as 12nS j|ninj  noutj |, where n is
the total sample of individuals, ninj is the number of in-migrants to state j, and n
out
j is the number of out-migrants from state j. Gross and net
rates are estimated separately for workers who report moving for job-related and non-job reasons.
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Figure A2: Comparison of job-related migration rates in PSID and CPS
The job-motivated migration rate is the share of household heads aged 25-64, who report changing residence for a job-related reason in the
previous year. I plot migration rates of any distance and cross-state rates separately. The “any distance” PSID series can be constructed for all
years between 1970 and 2009, excluding even years since 1998 (when no survey was conducted). The cross-state series can be constructed for
those same years excluding 1970. I report CPS estimates since 1999, when respondents were first asked why they moved. The definition of
household heads differs between the PSID and CPS. Household heads in the PSID are always male, unless there is no husband (or cohabiting
partner) present or the husband is too ill to respond to the survey. In contrast, the CPS might define a husband or wife as the reference
person. For the purpose of this exercise, I construct a PSID-equivalent household head definition in the CPS data. Specifically, I use the CPS’s
definitions, unless there is female head living with a male partner - in which case I designate the male as the head.
B Evidence on market tightness and search intensity
The model predicts that the large expected job surplus in skilled markets is manifested in (1)
tight labor markets and (2) intensive job search by both firms and workers. In this section, I
document evidence for both claims. Of course, conditional on the model, these measures can
also be interpreted as proxies for the expected surplus itself.
B.1 Market tightness
Every month, the Conference Board reports the number of new online job ads and ads reposted
from the previous month on 16,000 online job boards,57 known as the Help Wanted Online
(HWOL) series. This data is also disaggregated by occupational SOC classification. I use a
(pre-recession) data release from April 200858 and take the ratio of these vacancy counts to
occupational unemployment estimates from the IPUMS American Community Survey (ACS)
of 200759. In Figure B1, I plot this vacancy-unemployment ratio on occupational college em-
ployment share60. For low skilled occupations (with college share below 40 percent), the ratio
ranges from 0.02 to 0.32; and rises to between 0.14 to 3.40 for occupations with more than
57See http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/press/TechnicalPDF_5202_1401797782.pdf for further de-
tails.
58http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/HWOnLine043007_PR.pdf
59In the ACS, unemployed workers were asked to report their most recent occupation. The IPUMS ACS data
was compiled by Ruggles et al. (2010)
60I also estimate college share using data from the ACS of 2007.
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40 percent college employment.61 An important concern with this data is that online job ads
clearly do not represent the universe of occupations; and higher skilled jobs are perhaps more
likely to be advertised online. However, it does not seem plausible that this can explain the
very large effect of skill in Figure B1.
B.2 Firms’ search effort
If the free entry condition holds, the model predicts that a firm’s instantaneous advertising
expenditure is invariant with expected job surplus. But in any case, as vacancy duration is
increasing in job surplus (as I show in Appendix D), we should expect firms to spend more
over the duration of each vacancy.
I present some evidence on firms’ search effort (or “advertising intensity” in the model)
from a pair of employer surveys in 1992 and 2001, funded by the Small Business Adminis-
tration (SBA) and conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Kentucky62
(see Berger, Barron and Black, 2001b). Of interest to this study, respondents were asked a
number of questions related to the application process of their most recent hire, together with
that hire’s highest qualification. And I report mean outcomes by education group in Table B1,
per individual hired for each advertised position.
All the measures of firm search effort over the hiring process are increasing in education.
In 1992, the effects are very large and monotonic across education groups. On average, firms
received 35 applications, conducted 8 interviews and spent 34 human resource hours per hire
at postgraduate level; but these numbers are just 10, 3 and 5 at high school dropout level. The
story is qualitatively similar in 2001, though the monotonicity result does not hold in each case.
Also, magnitudes do vary across surveys. In particular, the number of applications received per
hire was significantly larger in the earlier survey, with a sample average of 15.1 compared to
6.7 in 2001; though the reported standard errors for this variable were much larger in 1992.
The 2001 survey also reports the time required to fill the vacancy, and I present means by
education group in the final column. As predicted by the model (see Appendix D below), dura-
tions are significantly longer for higher skilled workers, ranging from 3 weeks for dropouts to
10 weeks for postgraduates (per worker hired). This is consistent with the market tightness pat-
terns in Figure B1: firms respond to the large job surpluses in skilled markets by creating many
more vacancies; so in equilibrium, they trade off larger gains per job with lower recruitment
rates. These longer vacancy durations may account for much of the variation in applications
received and HR hours invested.
61The dispersion in tightness among skilled occupations is large. It is plausible that the loose markets that
characterize the arts/sport/media or education/training categories are attributable to restricted firm entry in those
industries, but this is merely speculation: there are certainly many factors at play.
62These can be downloaded from http://harris.uchicago.edu/directory/faculty/dan_black. In both 1992 and
2001, the investigators contacted a nationally representative sample of establishments. In 1992, 1,288 establish-
ments completed the survey (with a response rate of 55.9 to 60.6 percent, depending on the method used). And in
2001, there were 1,024 completions with a response rate of 47.1 to 48.1 percent.
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The model also predicts that firms apply search effort more broadly geographically when
recruiting high skilled workers. The SBA survey does not report this sort of information. But,
there is some useful evidence in an annual survey of recruitment conducted by the Chartered In-
stitute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) in the UK. In particular, the annual report of 2004
presents data on firms’ advertising strategies by occupational rank. In the CIPD sample, 61 per-
cent of firms recruiting managers and professionals posted job ads in national newspapers and
67 percent posted ads in the trade press; this compares to just 8 and 6 percent respectively for
firms recruiting manual or craft workers. In contrast, manual/craft recruiters were more likely
to post ads in local newspapers: 78 percent compared to 48 percent for manager/professional
recruiters.
B.3 Workers’ search effort
Despite high skilled markets being much tighter (see Figure B1), Table B1 shows there are still
many more applicants per position. This suggests that higher skilled workers are individually
applying to many more jobs than the low skilled. This is indicative of greater search intensity,
which is consistent with the model’s predictions.
More direct evidence on workers’ search intensity can be extracted from the CPS. Before
1994, the CPS asked unemployed job-seekers which search methods they used. In Table B2,
I report the share of job-seekers in each education group using each search method. I restrict
the sample to individuals aged 25-64 in the 1988-93 waves of the March CPS: answers to this
question were consistently coded over this period. Higher skilled workers are more likely to
have placed or check advertisements (51 percent of postgraduates compared to 32 percent of
high school dropouts), used private job agencies (22 percent of postgraduates compared to 6
percent of dropouts) and used other unspecified methods (10 compared to 4 percent). The low
skilled are somewhat more likely to have used public job agencies (27 percent of dropouts
compared to 20 percent of postgraduates), though this is presumably a reflection of the type of
jobs advertised.
Related to this is the role of social networks in job search. Most studies tend to show
around half of workers find their job through a personal contact (see Granovetter, 1995, for a
survey and original analysis). Since higher skilled workers benefit from larger job surpluses, my
model would predict they invest more heavily in developing broader social networks. Indeed,
Granovetter finds that higher skilled workers are relatively more likely to have found their job
through “work” contacts rather than “family/social” contacts; and it might be presumed that
“work” contacts are somewhat more costly to maintain.
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Table B1: Evidence on firms’ search effort from the SBA survey
Reported statistics are means, per worker hired for advertised position
PANEL A: SBA survey 1992
Education of Applications Applicants HR labor Sample
most recent hire received interviewed hours
HS dropout 9.89 2.61 4.76 72
(27.15) (2.84) (6.94)
HS graduate 9.91 4.54 9.31 415
(16.18) (5.75) (12.44)
Some college 12.31 4.83 12.16 290
(23.05) (4.92) (16.60)
Undergraduate 26.25 5.72 25.89 207
(54.41) (5.65) (43.56)
Postgraduate 35.49 7.66 33.77 51
(56.54) (8.82) (37.79)
PANEL B: SBA survey 2001
Education of Applications Applicants HR labor Weeks Sample
most recent hire received interviewed hours to fill
HS dropout 3.66 3.03 11.19 2.87 85
(4.49) (3.79) (22.55) (5.96)
HS graduate 5.30 3.15 8.10 2.52 415
(12.10) (3.32) (11.78) (7.32)
Some college 6.21 4.33 13.15 4.89 182
(7.98) (5.66) (21.00) (17.44)
Undergraduate 12.36 4.77 23.12 6.98 148
(23.99) (8.71) (37.83) (16.81)
Postgraduate 10.51 3.80 40.51 9.51 33
(13.03) (3.11) (76.89) (23.05)
These estimates are based on two employer surveys in 1992 and 2001, funded by
the Small Business Administration (SBA) and conducted by the Survey Research
Center at the University of Kentucky. The data files can be downloaded from
http://harris.uchicago.edu/directory/faculty/dan_black. Respondents were asked a
number of questions related to the application process of their most recent hire, to-
gether with that hire’s highest qualification. I report mean outcomes by education
group, per worker hired for each advertised position. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B2: Search methods of the unemployed
Reported statistics are percentages of those looking for work, by education group
Search method HS HS Some Under Post
dropout graduate college graduate graduate
Placed/checked ads 32.19 41.56 47.14 49.19 51.13
Contacted employer 70.87 69.9 68.5 69.95 71.47
Public job agency 26.63 28.87 29.15 24.22 19.77
Private job agency 5.75 8.08 12.44 18.25 22.18
Asked friends/relatives 26.23 20.86 22.36 23.74 22.46
Other method 3.66 5.67 7.09 7.46 10.17
Observations (000s) 4.24 6.51 3.27 1.47 0.71
This table reports, by education group, the percentage of those looking for work (in
the last four weeks) using each search method. The sample consists of unemployed
individuals aged 25-64, who looked for work during the preceding four weeks, in the
CPS March waves of 1988-1993.
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Figure B1: Ratio of online job ads to unemployment (Conference Board, Apr 2007; ACS 2007)
Data on vacancies for 22 SOC occupations are taken from the Conference Board Help Wanted Online series for April 2007. And I estimate
unemployment counts using the American Community Survey (ACS) of 2007: in the ACS, unemployed workers were asked to report their
most recent occupation. I also use the ACS to estimate occupation-specific shares of college graduates, reported on the x-axis.
C Extensions to the model
C.1 Endogenous separation rate
In the main text, I have assumed the job separation rate d is exogenous. But, the fact that
skilled workers face lower separation rates (see Table 1) may itself be a consequence of larger
job surpluses, driven fundamentally by larger y¯  b and s . As I have shown in the main text,
the expected surplus is decreasing in d . So, this endogeneity would merely serve to amplify
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the effect of given changes in y¯ b or s on the expected surplus.
Endogeneity in d can be introduced through randomness in the match productivity, after
job formation. Suppose, for example, match productivity follows a random walk:
y0 = y+z (C1)
The initial productivity y (when the match is formed) is drawn from the distribution F as before.
But now, i.i.d. draws of z arrive at rate y from some distribution G. The match is destroyed
if the surplus S (y) falls below zero. For given G, the rate of job destruction is clearly lower in
markets with larger surpluses.63
But of course, the distributionGmay vary with education. In particular, skilled jobs may be
associated with greater accumulation of firm-specific human capital (see Lillard and Tan, 1992;
Mincer, 1991 for evidence on training), so skilled workers would benefit from larger draws of
z . This would further reduce the probability of separation (see Mincer, 1991).
C.2 On-the-job search
Until now, I have ruled out on-the-job search. While this assumption greatly simplifies the
exposition, it does not affect the key results. Consider a world in which workers can search
whenever they wish. They make a job-to-job move when they receive an offer with surplus
exceeding zero (or exceeding the matching cost in the national market).64 The surplus accruing
to a job-to-job move is defined as:
S (y,w0) = E (wX (y,w0)) E (w0)+ J (y,wX (y,w0)) V¯ (C2)
=
1
r+d
(wX (y,w0) w0)+ 1r+d (y wX (y,w0)) 
r
r+d
V¯
=
1
r+d
(y w0  rV¯ )
where y is the productivity of the new job, and w0 is the wage of the worker’s previous job.
The wage offer of the new job wX (y,w0) is fully determined by y and w0, together with the
matching cost mX :
wX (y,w0) = f (y  rV¯ )+(1 f)(mX + rE (w0)) (C3)
withmL = 0 andmN =m> 0. Notice the employment value E (w)must now include the returns
to search:
63See Sengul (2009) for similar reasoning, in the context of skill differences in separation rates.
64For simplicity, I rule out the possibility that a worker can renegotiate his wage in his current match after
receiving a better offer elsewhere. See Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) for a search model with this feature.
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rE (w) = w+d (U E (w)) (C4)
+ Â
X={L,N}
max
sX
(
sX
✓
a¯X
s¯X
q
◆1 a
EˆX (w)  12 g˜sXs
2
X
)
where sX is the search effort directed at a vacancy in market X . I assume search is more costly
for the employed: g˜sX > gsX ; this ensures unemployed workers do not simply accept every offer
which pays more than their out-of-work income b. EˆX (w) is the ex ante expected value to the
employed worker of a job offer in market X . Specifically:
EˆX (w) =
ˆ
y0
max
 
E
 
wX
 
y0,w
   E (w) mX ,0 dF (C5)
where w is the worker’s current wage, and y0 denotes the productivity of the new offer. For
employed workers, the first order condition for search intensity is:
sX (w) =
f
gsX
✓
a¯X
s¯X
q
◆1 a ˆ
y
max
 
S
 
y0,w
  mX ,0 dF (C6)
where S (y0,w) is the surplus, gross of the matching cost, which accrues to a match of quality
y0, involving an employed worker with a job currently paying wage w.
Assuming y⇠U (y¯ s , y¯+s), as in the main text, the expected surplus accruing to a local
market job-to-job transition is:
ˆ
y
max{S (y,w0) ,0} = 14s (r+d ) (y¯+s  w0  rV¯ )
2 (C7)
For a given current wage w0, notice this is increasing in y¯ and s and decreasing in d . Certainly,
the current wage w0 will tend to be larger in an economy with larger y¯ and s , and this will
diminish the expected surplus somewhat. But, this latter effect will not dominate. Intuitively,
in the Nash bargain, workers do not receive the entire surplus from changes in y¯, s and d in
their wage w0; so the expected surplus will grow overall.
And therefore, the ratio of the national to local expected surplus must also be increasing in
y¯ and s and decreasing in d :
´
ymax{S (y,w0) m,0}´
ymax{S (y,w0) ,0}
=
"
1  m
2
s
r+d
s
1´
ymax{S (y,w0) ,0}dF
#2
(C8)
And based on equation (33) in the main text, the same must be true of the relative national-local
search intensity sNsL and finding rate
rN
rL .
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C.3 Non-job migration
The model in the main text deals exclusive with “job-motivated” migration. This is appropriate
for this study, given that evidence from the CPS shows the skill mobility gap is entirely ex-
plained by moves of this type. Having said that, it is possible to analyze other types of moves
within the framework described by the model. In particular, suppose that a worker i’s em-
ployment value depends on an individual-specific valuation of local amenities ai j in the city of
employment j. Building on equation (5) in the main text:
rEXi j (y) = wXi j (y)+ai j+d
 
U EXi j (y)
 
(C9)
At any point in time, each worker i is associated with a vector of amenity valuations over all
cities j: {ai1, ...,aiJ}. At random intervals, workers draw a new amenity vector. In particular,
suppose an employed worker randomly draws a very large amenity match ai j for some city j,
perhaps due to family needs. If the shock is large, the surplus associated with the worker’s
current job would become small. He would then search intensively (on-the-job) for new em-
ployment in city j and would eventually move there. This would be a “non-job” move, in the
sense that it was triggered by an amenity draw ai j, rather than a productivity draw y.
What is the effect of a decrease in the national matching cost m? Clearly, workers are more
likely to act on local differentials in amenity valuations if moving is cheaper. And consequently,
for a given distribution of ai j and arrival rate of amenity shocks, the non-job migration rate
would be larger.
And what is the effect of an increase in the expected job surplus, due to changes in y¯  b,
s or d? A given shock to the ai j vector would be less likely to tempt workers away from their
current job. So, while the job-motivated rate of migration would grow, the non-job rate would
contract. This is consistent with evidence from Table 7 in the main text.
C.4 Move-then-search
The model in Section 2 restricts workers to moving only after coming into contact with a
prospective match partner: as Table A1 shows, very few individuals move speculatively to
look for work. But in any case, according to Table 7, the incidence of speculative moves is
decreasing in skill. I argue this is consistent with my hypothesis.
I interpret a speculative move in the model as a change of worker’s origin. Suppose unem-
ployed workers have the the option of switching origin at cost c. I assume c exceeds the national
market matching cost m, since it is difficult to move to a new city with no steady income. A
worker of origin j will make a speculative move if:
Uj <max
k
Uk 6= j  c (C10)
Clearly, in an equilibrium with identical cities, no workers will choose to make speculative
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moves. But, workers of origin j will switch origin following an adverse local productivity
shock. In fact, since there are constant returns to production, no workers and firms will remain
in city j in equilibrium. To ensure stability in the model, some form of diminishing returns
must be injected, whether in the production technology or through an inelastic supply of local
housing.
How do changes in moving costs and the expected surplus affect the incidence of spec-
ulative moves, given some local productivity shock? Clearly, smaller moving costs (with m
and c both affected) will encourage both more cross-city matches and more speculative moves.
But, a larger expected surplus will discourage speculative moves. This is because national
market search and speculative migration are substitutes. Larger job surpluses can sustain more
intensive cross-city search, obviating the need for costly speculative moves.
D Derivations of local market results from Section 3
In this appendix, I derive the responses of the local expected job surplus and the local job
finding rate to changes in y¯ b, s and d . As in the main text, I suppress the national market to
simplify the exposition. To ease the notation, I define the following terms:
Definition 1. W =
´
ymax{S (y) ,0}dF = 14s(r+d ) (y¯+s   rU  rV )2 is the expected job sur-
plus.
Definition 2. G = F (y˜) = 12s (s   y¯+ rU+ rV ) is the ex ante probability (before the produc-
tivity is determined) of a match being accepted.
Definition 3. p = 1gas g1 aa
is an exogenous parameter summarizing the ease of search.
Proposition 1. The local expected surplus and job finding rate are increasing in y¯ b.
Notice first that:
dW
d (y¯ b) =
1 G
r+d
✓
1  r dU˘
d (y¯ b)
◆
(D1)
To make progress, I need to know how U˘ responds. Substituting equation (21) for q in the
unemployment value (19) gives:
rU˘ =
1
2
✓
1 f
f
q
◆1 a
p (fW)2 (D2)
=
1
2
"✓
1 f
f
◆2 rU˘
rV
#1 a
p (fW)2
And differentiating with respect to y¯ b:
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r
dU˘
d (y¯ b) =
✓
1 f
f
q
◆1 a
pf2W dW
d (y¯ b) +(1 a)r
dU˘
d (y¯ b) (D3)
=
✓
1 f
f
q
◆1 a
pf2W1 G
r+d
✓
1  r dU˘
d (y¯ b)
◆
+(1 a)r dU˘
d (y¯ b)
=
fr
r+d
✓
1  r dU˘
d (y¯ b)
◆
+(1 a)r dU˘
d (y¯ b)
=
fr
a (r+d )+fr
where r is the job finding rate, as defined in equation (22). Substituting this back into (D1)
gives:
dW
d (y¯ b) =
a (1 G)
a (r+d )+fr
(D4)
which is positive, so the expected surplus is increasing in y¯  b. To assess the impact on the
finding rate, notice first that:
d (1 G)
d (y¯ b) =
1
2s
✓
1  r dU˘
d (y¯ b)
◆
(D5)
=
1
2s
· a (r+d )
a (r+d )+fr
Next, consider the finding rate r . After substituting equation (21) for q in (22), r can be
expressed as:
r =
✓
1 f
f
q
◆1 a
pfW(1 G) (D6)
=
"✓
1 f
f
◆2 rU˘
rV
#1 a
pfW(1 G)
And differentiating with respect to y¯ b:
dr
d (y¯ b) = (1 a)
r
rU˘
r
dU˘
d (y¯ b) +
r
W
dW
d (y¯ b) +
r
1 G
d (1 G)
d (y¯ b) (D7)
=
(4 a)r
a (r+d )+fr
· r+d
2s (1 G)
which is clearly positive.
Proposition 2. The local expected surplus is increasing in s , but the effect on the local job
finding rate is ambiguous.
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Notice first that:
dW
ds
=
1 G
r+d
✓
G  rdU˘
ds
◆
(D8)
And differentiating (D2) with respect to s :
r
dU˘
ds
=
✓
1 f
f
q
◆1 a
pf2WdW
ds
+(1 a)rdU˘
ds
(D9)
=
✓
1 f
f
q
◆1 a
pf2W1 G
r+d
✓
G  rdU˘
ds
◆
+(1 a)rdU˘
ds
=
f
r+d
r
✓
G  rdU˘
ds
◆
+(1 a)rdU˘
ds
=
frG
a (r+d )+fr
Substituting this back into (D8) gives:
dW
ds
=
a (1 G)G
a (r+d )+fr
(D10)
which is positive, so the expected surplus is increasing in s . To assess the impact on the finding
rate, notice first that:
d (1 G)
ds
=
1
2s
✓
2G 1  rdU˘
ds
◆
(D11)
=
1
2s

a (r+d )G
a (r+d )+fr
  (1 G)
 
And differentiating (D6) with respect to s :
dr
ds
= (1 a) r
rU˘
r
dU˘
ds
+
r
W
dW
ds
+
r
1 G
d (1 G)
ds
(D12)
=
r
2s

(4 a)(r+d )
a (r+d )+fr
· G
1 G  1
 
The sign of this expression depends on the parameters of the model.
Proposition 3. The local expected surplus is decreasing in d , but the effect on the local job
finding rate is ambiguous.
Notice first that:
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dW
dd
= 1 G
r+d
✓
1 G
r+d
s + rdU˘
dd
◆
(D13)
And differentiating (D2) with respect to d :
r
dU˘
dd
=
✓
1 f
f
q
◆1 a
pf2WdW
dd
+(1 a)rdU˘
dd
(D14)
=   f
r+d
r
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1 G
r+d
s + rdU˘
dd
◆
=   s
r+d
· fr (1 G)
a (r+d )+fr
Substituting this back into (D13) gives:
dW
dd
=  aW
a (r+d )+fr
(D15)
which is negative, so the expected surplus is decreasing in d . To assess the impact on the
finding rate, notice first that:
d (1 G)
dd
=   1
2s
· rdU˘
dd
(D16)
=
1
2(r+d )
· fr (1 G)
a (r+d )+fr
And differentiating (D6) with respect to d :
dr
dd
= (1 a) r
rU˘
r
dU˘
dd
+
r
W
dW
dd
+
r
1 G
d (1 G)
dd
(D17)
=
r
a (r+d )+fr

fr
2(r+d )
 2 a
 
The sign of this expression depends on the parameters of the model.
Proposition 4. The local hiring rate is decreasing in y¯ b and s and increasing in d .
Let l denote the instantaneous probability of hiring a worker:
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l =
✓
1 f
f
q
◆ a
pfW(1 G) (D18)
=
"✓
1 f
f
◆2 rU˘
rV
# a
pfW(1 G)
=
4frV
(1 f)2 ·
r+d
y¯ b+s   rU˘  rV¯
Given the results above on responses of rU˘ , it is clear that r+dy¯ b+s rU˘ rV¯ is decreasing in y¯ b
and s and increasing in d . And so, the same must be true of the hiring rate l .
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